The idea of Kosovo being the Jerusalem of Serbia is not only an exaggeration but also a lie. The following article debunks this ultra-nationalist myth. Malcolm writes:

“At the time, the Serbian government made great efforts to
bolster its case and turn it into the dominant interpretation. A memorandum sent to the Great Powers by Belgrade in early 1913 set out three justifications for Serbian rule in Kosovo: the ‘moral right of a more civilized people’; the historic right to an area which contained the Patriarchate buildings of the Serbian Orthodox Church and had once been part of the medieval Serbian empire; and a kind of ethnographic right based on the fact that at some time in the Kosovo had had a majority Serb population – a right which, according to the memorandum, was unaffected by the ‘recent invasion’ of Albanians”

Of these three lines of argument, the first was rapidly devalued by the actual behaviour of the Serbian (and, subsequently, Yugoslav) regime in Kosovo. The second was in two parts, one relating to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the other more generally to the medieval empire. Claims are still made today that Kosovo is the ‘Jerusalem’ of the Serbs; but this has always been something of an exaggeration.

In no form of Christianity, including Eastern Orthodoxy, does a ‘holy place’ play any sort of theological role equivalent to the role of Jerusalem in the theology of Judaism. The seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church was not founded in Kosovo; it merely moved there after its original foundation (in central Serbia) was burnt down. Nor does the Patriarchate have any continuous history as an institution: it was re-created by the modern Yugoslav state in 1920 (having been defunct for 154 years), and since that date the Patriarch has tended to reside mainly in Belgrade.

As for the Serbian empire, this was a medieval state which had its origins not in Kosovo but in Rascia, an area beyond Kosovo’s north-western border, and most of the important early medieval Serbian monasteries and churches were built outside Kosovo itself. But in any case, the main objection here must be that it makes no sense to base claims of modern political ownership on the geography of long-gone kingdoms or empires.

This objection is a simple point, but one which people in the Balkans sometimes find it convenient to ignore. Edith Durham, who knew the region well and witnessed the effects of the Serb-Montenegrin conquest of Kosovo in 1912, later recalled a characteristic exchange: ‘I once pointed out to a Serb schoolmaster that we had held Calais at the same time but that did not give us the right to it. He replied: “Why not? You have a fleet.’”

Of the three arguments in the Serbian memorandum cited above, the third, about ethnography, is the one that has most bedevilled all historical writing about Kosovo. Looking at some historical works from the region itself, one might almost think that ethnic demography was the only real subject-matter of Kosovo’s history. (The present book, it is hoped, will give a different impression.)

Some modern Albanian writers argue, quite implausibly, that there was always an Albanian majority in Kosovo, even in the medieval Serbian kingdom; many Serbs believe, equally falsely, that there were no Albanians at all in Kosovo before the end of the seventeenth century. One historical-demographic myth which enjoyed great power in the late nineteenth century was the idea that most of the Albanians in Kosovo were ‘really’ Slavs; while it is true that ethnic identities have always been fluid to some extent, this claim is simply not justified by the historical evidence. Another myth has grown up around the ‘Great Migration’ of the Serbs in 1690 which, it is alleged, created a demographic vacuum, subsequently filled by a flood of alien Albanians from outside Kosovo.

A closer study of the evidence, presented in this book, will suggest that although there were heavy war losses in 1690, affecting all categories of population, most aspects of the ‘Great Migration’ story are fanciful. And the evidence also suggests that, while there was a steady flow of Albanians from northern Albania into Kosovo, a major component of the Albanians’ demographic growth there was the expansion of an indigenous Albanian population within Kosovo itself.

Reference

Kosovo : a short history, p.34-36