Authored by Petrit Latifi

In the publication “Ustanak Malisora 1911” by Dragan R. Zivojinovic, we read of the Red Cross activities in northern Albania in 1910-1911. Many Catholic Albanians fled to Montenegron for refuge due to Ottoman and Turkish massacres and atrocities. According to Charles Crane, the situation in Albania was unbearable. An Albanian-American named Chris Potsy tried to get Woodrov Wilson engaged in the situation.

Saxed from the publication:

“The Chicago newspaper Herald Tribune (Herald Tribune), in its edition of June 26, 1911, brought a brief news from its correspondent from Vienna about the situation in northern Albania and Montenegro. In a short article, it was indicated that the situation in those countries was critical, as well as that “the Turks brought 50,000 soldiers within a one-day march to the Montenegrin border”.

This news was brought to Vienna by Charles Crane, an industrial magnate and progressive from Chicago, later close to President Woodrow Wilson. Crane already showed a keen interest in Southeast Europe, and especially in Imperial Russia, where he had significant business interests. Those very days, he returned from a trip around the Balkan peninsula, during which he visited, among other cities, Cetinje, as well as some areas in Albania.

The situation in Albania was described by Crane as “unsustainable”; Turks are destroying entire regions, killing prisoners, escaped women and children, burning homes and crops, destroying churches. In his opinion, a great mass of women and children and old people were caught between the two wings of the Turkish armies, so that escape was not possible. In his statement to the press, Crane announced that “about 25,000 women and children fled to Montenegro and are starving there, as their food consisted only of boiled grass and various roots that they manage to collect.

No matter how short and meager it was, the news was significant in that it drew the public’s attention to the events in a distant country, to the character of the struggle, as well as to the methods used by the Turkish authorities to suppress the rebellion. It was, in fact, the first notice to the American public, poorly informed and uninterested in the situation in the Balkan Peninsula, of a movement that had broken out a year earlier, a movement that at first enjoyed support and received help from Montenegro and its ruler.

Of course, the news from Vienna did not give any explanation about the causes of the conflict in northern Albania, i.e. about the reasons for the Turkish armed intervention, as well as the reasons and motives for which Montenegro exposed itself to the danger of finding itself in conflict with its once powerful neighbor, the Turkish Empire. Even so, the news in the Herald Tribune, regardless of its incompleteness and harshness, was enough to set in motion a relief effort that eventually found both humanitarian organizations and individuals in the United States

The number of Malisors who fled to Montenegro in 1910 and 1911 was different. At first he wasn’t big, so the Malisors could be taken care of. A number of these refugees were eventually transferred to the interior of Montenegro. Later, as the number of refugees grew more and more, due to mass slaughter and destruction by Turkish troops, Bashibozuk and others, the problems surrounding their accommodation and sustenance became more and more complex.

Many refugees, especially men, were wounded or injured in clashes with the army; special care should be taken of them; they were treated in the hospital in Podgorica and elsewhere. In September 1910, the number of refugees, mostly women, children and the elderly, was increasing again.

The Montenegrin authorities, faced with an ever-growing mass of refugees, appealed to the people to help them and welcome them into their homes, regardless of religion and nationality. Committees were organized to collect aid in money and food. At the end of October 1910, the number of refugees in Montenegro exceeded 2,000 people.

The following year was even more difficult and restless. New groups of refugees were crossing into Montenegro, looking for refuge and help. 18 The government could not allow them to starve, wandering from village to village or from town to town, and begging along the way. Montenegro hoped that such a difficult situation of the refugees, as well as the inability to continue paying for their support, would convince the great powers and interest them in the opportunities that existed in the country.

However, convinced that Montenegro was encouraging the Malisor leaders to persevere in resistance, the forces were not ready to come to their aid in the way that was expected in Cetinje. Moreover, with the approach of the spring of 1911, new waves of refugees crossed into Montenegro. There were a lot of them with cattle, but just as many without them.

The actions of the Shkodër bashibozuk forced hundreds of women, children and old people to take shelter; many villages and churches were burned and abandoned; the people crossing into Montenegro were in the most miserable condition. The report from Podgorica dated April 13, 1911 shows how great was the dilemma in which the representatives of the local authorities found themselves, faced with the constantly arriving people whose nakedness and misery were appalling. It was difficult for the tortured, sick and hungry people to cross the border and save their bare lives from the knife and fire of the bashibozuka.

According to the report of the Russian ambassador to Cetinje, the number of Malesori refugees in Montenegro at the end of July 1911 was between 8,000 and 9,000 people.

As indicated earlier, the American interest in the opportunities in Montenegro began only when the rebellion was at an end, when the Turkish amnesty was announced and when the refugees began to return to their homes. In fact, the American public and the government were informed about it thanks to two unrelated, though time-parallel, actions.

In fact, the news published in the Chicago Herald Tribune was used by Chris Potsey, an American of Albanian origin, as a reason to start his action. It should be emphasized that this action was of a purely private nature. Potsi escaped from Albania, because of his nationalist activities, in the first years of the 6th century. After arriving in America, he settled in Salt Lake City, in the state of Utah, in the southwest of the United States.

Over time, he gained a reputation and reputation as a reliable man, who was ready to come to the aid of his compatriots in Albania at any moment. Attaching a clipping from the Herald Tribune, Potsey wrote a letter to Michael Woods, the charity’s CEO in Salt Lake City, asking for advice. Potsey supplemented the news from the newspaper with the information he received from Valona.

In them, Potsi was asked to initiate an immediate action in America to help Albanian refugees. Trying to impress Woods as much as possible, Potsey emphasized that all people on earth are brothers, that distance should not make any difference, etc. Otherwise, claimed Potoi, the Albanians will be exterminated by the Turkish soldiers. Potsi asked for advice on whether to publish an appeal for aid to “that Christian country”, specifically for food aid for hungry refugees in Albania and Montenegro.

The next day, Woods responded with a short letter to Potsey, assuring him that he fully understood his apprehension and communicating his desire and willingness to help. Woods did not consider it appropriate that the appeal for help should be published in Salt Lake City, but that the American Red Cross in Washington should be interested. In addition, Woods demanded that Potsey visit him, so that they could discuss all of this in more detail.

Mozes, an American humanitarian, believed that the constant Turkish efforts to disarm the Albanians led to the rebellion and their subsequent flight to Montenegro. In his opinion, around 6,000 Albanians escaped in October-February 1910. They lived in extreme poverty. The Montenegrin government gave them a minimum aid of about four cents a day – for subsistence.

This aid was distributed during the entire time that negotiations were being conducted for their return to their homes. After the conclusion of the so-called Cetinje Protocol, it was decided to carry out the complete repatriation of all refugees who were in Montenegro. However, Mozes points out, the provisions of the protocol have not been fully implemented; new punitive measures against the refugees would be organized, so that Malisori were once again forced to take up arms.

A new expedition against the rebels was led by Kurds and other mercenaries from Asia Minor. Before that force and the soldiery, which burned and destroyed in front of them, the masses of refugees had to cross over to Montenegro again in search of refuge.

According to Mozes, in the spring of 1911, there were about 13,000 Malisor refugees in Montenegro, mostly women, old people and children. They were mostly settled in the Podgorica region. “Many Malisors lived with Montenegrin peasants, some settled in herdsmen’s huts, while others lived in numerous holes dug in the ground; the most rugged ones found shelter in caves near Morača”.

Those Malisori who lived near the Montenegrin border, upon hearing the news about the arrival of the Turkish army, moved to Montenegro with livestock and movable property, but the largest number of refugees were without any means of livelihood. Mozes especially emphasizes the readiness of the Montenegrin peasants, which he considers “amazing”, to accept these “semi-invited guests”, sharing with them their meager food and providing them with shelter. .

Mozes emphasizes that the government came to the aid of Cetinje by distributing daily corn in Podgorica, worth around 50,000 crowns per month. He considers it a significant cost for Montenegro, especially because this movement of Malisor threatened crafts, agriculture and trade.

Concluding his last report, sent to Washington, on the situation of Malisor refugees, Mozes expressed his doubts about the readiness and ability of the Turkish authorities, military and civilian, to provide the refugees with the necessary and sufficient assistance. Therefore, Mozes warned his superiors, there is a need to continue the aid for several more months.

He learned from the British that they would continue to send aid, through the Red Cross, from Shkodër or St. John of Meduan. “If the American Red Cross”, Mozes concluded his letter, “continues to send aid, I suggest that I be authorized to send money or material to the British committee for expenditure or distribution”. days was, one might say, suppressed to the general satisfaction of the responsible persons of the State Department.

The action of the American Red Cross in Montenegro, although very limited in scope, represents an example so characteristic and illustrative of the manner and motives that contributed to its execution. First of all, the action of the Red Cross was completely dependent on the attitude of the State Department, it was guided by its reasons and considerations.

Reluctance to interfere in European issues and ignorance of the situation in certain countries, as was the case with Montenegro and Albania, were decisive factors that led official Washington not to interfere in the conflict on the Montenegrin-Albanian border. Because of all this, the action of the Red Cross remains completely humanitarian.

There was also a religious reason, i.e. the Catholicism of Malisor. The action was started on the initiative of an Albanian emigrant in America, on the one hand, and the American diplomatic representative, who personally saw the opportunities in Montenegro, on the other hand. The concordance of their reports was largely decisive for the final, successful outcome of the action. Because of all this, there is no action to provide assistance to refugees in Montenegro

a political landmark. Political reasons seemed repulsive to the Americans, as an obstacle to deeper involvement. In other words, political reasons acted in a negative sense. Seen in the perspective of today’s practice of great powers, when humanitarian, as well as other similar reasons, are used as a reason to participate in many similar actions, providing aid to Montenegro is the best evidence of how the practice of the United States has changed over the last fifty years.

It is not possible to assess the effect of American aid in Montenegro with precision. The amount was small, and that was the decisive factor for its effectiveness. However, the fact remains that the amount of 1,000 dollars was sent to the Montenegrin Red Cross, i.e. that he stayed in Montenegro.

Taking into account the fact that the refugees were already returning to their homes, it should be assumed that the Montenegrin Red Cross did not, at that moment, spend that sum for them. In any case, it was a small compensation for the costs, excitement and political risks that Montenegro took on by engaging actively on the side of Malisor in northern Albania.

Reference

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