Study by Rafael Floqi. Translation Petrit Latifi
Summary: The independence of Albania in 1912 was a decisive event with multiple implications, not only for Albanians but also for the Ottoman Empire and later for the Republic of Turkey. Turkish perspectives shifted across three stages: the final years of the Ottoman state, the period of the Young Turks, and the early decades of Atatürk’s Republic. At the same time, the attitudes of Muslim Albanians evolved from defending Ottoman autonomy to actively supporting independence, revealing tensions between religious identity, historical ties, and emerging national aspirations.
The Ottoman Empire: rejection and the offer of autonomy
When Albania declared independence on 28 November 1912, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a profound territorial and political collapse. The defeats of the Balkan Wars had eroded the Sultan’s authority and left the government in a position of weakness. In response, the Sublime Porte rejected the proclamation of independence and instead offered a limited form of self-government within the Empire.
A document from the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated December 1912 states:
“The Sultan’s government does not recognize the act of independence proclaimed in Vlora, but is ready to accept an autonomous Albania within the Empire.”
(BOA, HR.SYS. 2131/11)
This statement reflected two primary objectives:
• to avoid creating a precedent that could invite similar separatist movements elsewhere
• to preserve a strategic presence in the Adriatic and maintain influence in the western Balkans
The autonomy proposal was therefore not an attempt at concession but an effort to slow the disintegration of the Empire during a critical moment.
Military inability to prevent independence
Although the Ottoman government rejected Albanian independence, it lacked the military capacity to reverse the situation. The army was exhausted, demoralized, and scattered across multiple fronts after heavy defeats in the First Balkan War. Large-scale operations to retake Albanian territories were impossible.
With its forces overstretched and key strategic cities already lost, the government had no realistic means to impose its authority. Under these conditions, insisting on autonomy became the only feasible response, while Albanians recognized a rare opportunity to establish their own state.
The role of Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha
At the moment of Albania’s declaration, the Ottoman Grand Vizier was Kâmil Pasha (Mehmed Kâmil Paşa), a high-ranking statesman who served several terms during the last decades of the Empire. Research by Hasan Ali Polat shows that although Kâmil Pasha had earlier supported certain reforms, he ultimately clashed with the Young Turks and became one of their political rivals. He was forced from power in the January 1913 coup by the Committee of Union and Progress.
Kâmil Pasha viewed the Albanian act with suspicion and concern. He considered independence a threat both to the territorial integrity of the Empire and to the Muslim population of the region. His preferred solution was to maintain Albania under Ottoman suzerainty through an autonomous structure with an Ottoman prince at its head.
The Young Turks: Albanians as the Empire’s defensive shield
The Young Turks, organized under the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), had come to power after the 1908 Revolution and were committed to reasserting central authority. Their program emphasized administrative unification and the consolidation of state power.
To the Young Turks, Albania was not just another province but a strategic bastion. They regarded Albanian territories as the Empire’s western shield, a vital buffer against Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek expansion.
Talat Pasha, one of the key leaders of the CUP, expressed this view clearly:
“The Albanians are the protective tower of the Empire in the West. Losing them would mean the destruction of our political balance.”
(Talat Paşa, 1911, p. 45)
This perception shaped CUP policy toward Albania in 1912–1913. The Albanian declaration of independence was seen not merely as a local uprising but as a major geopolitical loss.
Reaction to the declaration of independence
When news of independence reached Istanbul, the response was swift and critical. Shortly after the Vlora Assembly declared the new state, Kâmil Pasha sent a telegram to Ismail Qemali expressing disapproval and urging reconsideration. He restated the autonomy proposal and warned that full separation would destabilize the remaining Ottoman provinces in the Balkans.
Despite losing control over most Balkan territories, the Ottoman government continued to insist on Albania’s “natural connection” to the Empire. This stance reflected a mixture of political resistance and cultural attachment, as Albania was one of the last Muslim-majority regions still associated with the Ottoman world.
Ottoman proposals for a prince of the imperial family
One of the lesser-known Ottoman responses was the plan to appoint an Ottoman prince as the leader of an autonomous Albania. Diplomatic correspondence from early 1913 indicates that several members of the imperial family were considered for this role. The idea served three key purposes:
• to retain symbolic Ottoman authority in the region
• to prevent Albania from falling under Austro-Hungarian or Italian influence
• to create a buffer state to slow Balkan territorial ambitions
Although the plan did not materialize, it reveals the extent to which the government sought to maintain a link with Albania even as its military presence collapsed.
Muslim Albanian reactions inside the Empire
Reactions among Muslim Albanians living within the Ottoman state were initially mixed. Many Albanian officials and officers serving in the administration or the army regarded independence as a rupture with a centuries-old political and religious center. They feared that separation would leave Albanian Muslims vulnerable to neighboring powers.
However, as the Balkan Wars progressed and Ottoman control vanished from Kosovo, Manastir, and other historically Albanian regions, attitudes changed dramatically. The Empire’s inability to protect Albanian territories led many to shift their support toward the idea of a sovereign Albanian state.
By early 1913, a significant portion of Albanian intellectuals and soldiers within the Empire recognized independence as the only viable solution to preserve Albanian identity and territory.
The role of the great powers and Ottoman isolation
Ottoman reactions were also shaped by the positions of the major European powers. Austria-Hungary strongly supported the Albanian cause to block Serbian access to the Adriatic, while Italy aimed to contain Greek influence and expand its own role in the region. Both pressured the Ottoman Empire not to intervene militarily.
Russia, in contrast, supported Serbia and Montenegro, encouraging Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans.
These rivalries left the Empire isolated and powerless. Without diplomatic allies or military means, the Sublime Porte could neither prevent Albanian independence nor influence the shape of the new state.
Transition from empire to republic: early Turkish views
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, attitudes toward Albania changed significantly. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the leaders of the new republic adopted a pragmatic approach. They recognized Albania as an independent nation and sought mutually respectful relations.
In the early Republican perspective, Albania was no longer an Ottoman province but a neighboring state with which Turkey shared historical and cultural connections. The two countries established diplomatic relations, signed bilateral agreements, and cooperated in matters of migration, trade, and security.
For Atatürk, the breakup of the Empire was final, and Albania’s independence was accepted as part of the new international order. This marked a decisive shift from the resistance of the late Ottoman period to the pragmatic diplomacy of the Turkish Republic.
References
Atatürk, M., 2002. Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vëll. 2. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
BOA, HR.SYS. 2131/11. Arkiva Osmane, Stamboll.
Clayer, N., 2007. Aux origines du nationalisme albanais. Paris: Karthala.
Jelavich, B., 1983. History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skendi, S., 1967. The Albanian National Awakening 1878–1912. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Talat Paşa, 1911. Hatıralar. Stamboll: Matba’a-i Osmaniye.
TBMM Zabıtları, 1923. Meclis Kayıtları. Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi.
StA HHStA PA/XII/417/6c, telegram by Lejhanec, Valona, 1912.12.04., No.753; Nr. 49. telegram by Esat Halasti to Nazim Pasha to Valona, 2.12.1912.,
Qeveria e Përkohëshme e Vlorës, 54. 9 ÖStA HHStA PA/XII/417/6c, telegrams by Lejhanec, Valona, 04.12.1912., No. 753. and 06.12.1912., No.1187.
10 Vlora, Lebenserinnerungen 2, 26. 11 ÖStA HHStA PA/XIX/Berchtold/1, Bd.IV. 11.12.1912., 466.
12 Vlora, Lebenserinnerungen 2, 26. 13 ÖStA HHStA PA/XII/417/6c, telegram by Lejhanec, Valona, 12.12.1912., No.2552.
13 Qeveria e Përkohëshme e Vlorës, KRISZTIÁN CSAPLÁR-DEGOVICS
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