Abstract

This article examines the Albanian proverb “Shkaut besë s’i zihet” (“The Slav cannot be trusted”) as a product of historical experience, collective memory, and oral tradition. Through an analysis of key episodes from 1912 to the post–World War II period, including wartime alliances, broken political assurances, civilian violence, and forced mobilizations, the study explores how perceptions of betrayal became embedded in Albanian historical consciousness. Rather than treating the proverb as an expression of ethnic essentialism, the article situates it within broader frameworks of trauma, power asymmetry, and mnemonic transmission in Balkan history.

The Serb as “Honorless” in Albanian folklore: Shkaut besë s’i zihet

There exists an Albanian proverb, “Shkaut besë s’i zihet,” which may be translated as “The Slav (Serb) has no besa and cannot be trusted.” The proverb is a severe and critical expression that reflects a deeply rooted perception of betrayal within Albanian historical memory.

It has traditionally been employed to describe acts of treachery, violence, and broken agreements, particularly in reference to Serbian vojvodas, local gendarmerie units, and state officials who were perceived to have violated agreements made with Albanian communities. This article examines the historical origins of the proverb, its sociocultural function, and its enduring impact on Albanian–Serbian discourse.

Following the Serbian invasion of Kosovo—historically referred to by Albanians as Dardania—in 1912, an extensive oral tradition developed among Albanians to preserve the memory of violence and repression that they associate with Serbian rule, a period spanning approximately a century. Former Albanian soldiers, poets, writers, and village elders (pleq) transmitted similar warnings across generations, frequently summarized in the refrain: “The Serb cannot be trusted.” These statements became part of a broader folklore intended to safeguard collective memory and identity.

Although such terminology may appear derogatory or ethnically chauvinistic when viewed through a contemporary lens, it is rooted in local folklore that claims historical grounding and was transmitted intergenerationally. This raises an important historiographical question: to what extent can the events underlying the proverb be historically verified? Addressing this question requires a closer examination of documented instances of Serbian state actions that Albanians have interpreted as betrayals.

Historical Context

Betrayal I: The Distribution of Arms Prior to the Balkan Wars

In the period preceding the First Balkan War of 1912, Serbian officials reportedly distributed arms to Albanian groups, ostensibly to assist them in resisting Ottoman forces. According to contemporary accounts, Albanians were led to believe that they would collaborate with Serbian forces against the Ottoman Empire. However, diplomatic reports—most notably those attributed to an English consul of the time—suggest that this arming of Albanian groups served Serbian strategic objectives rather than a genuine alliance.

These accounts indicate that Albanian fighters were expected to weaken Ottoman control, after which Serbian forces would neutralize the remaining Albanian resistance and consolidate control over Kosovo. This strategy was allegedly accompanied by a propaganda campaign in Serbian newspapers that exaggerated or fabricated claims of “Albanian atrocities against Christian Slavs,” narratives that subsequently reached European media outlets and garnered international attention and sympathy.

Following the withdrawal of Ottoman forces, Serbian military units entered Kosovo and turned against Albanian fighters and civilians alike. The Chetnik leader Dragutin Dimitrijević (“Apis”) is said to have betrayed Isa Boletini, a prominent Albanian leader. Subsequent Serbian military actions reportedly resulted in the mass killing of Albanian civilians; some Albanian historiographical sources estimate that tens of thousands were killed during this period, the majority of whom were non-combatants.

Betrayal II: Broken Promises of Immunity by Serbian Leadership

A second frequently cited example concerns assurances allegedly given by Serbian political leadership prior to the Balkan War. Nikola Pašić, along with representatives of King Peter I, reportedly promised Albanian leaders in the Kosovo Vilayet that Albanian civilians would not be harmed following the Ottoman withdrawal. These assurances included guarantees of personal safety, property protection, and non-interference.

Albanian accounts contend that these promises were swiftly violated once Serbian forces entered Prishtina, where mass killings reportedly occurred and numerous Albanian villages throughout Kosovo were burned. These events reinforced Albanian perceptions of systemic betrayal and contributed to the entrenchment of the proverb within Albanian collective memory.

Betrayal III: The Serbian Killing of Defenseless Albanians Civilians, Women, Elderly, Children in 1912

Another betrayal, in comparison to Albanian forces, was the Serbian massacres of civilians which was both an order from the Serbian government, and voluntarily carried out by all Serbian military personal. These crimes included: piercing babies in cradles, raping little girls, piercing with bayonets young boys to death, piercing unarmed Albanian men, piercing pregnant women and killing the fetus, burning elderly and civilians alive in their homes after tricking them to come out, locking Albanian civilians into mosques and blowing it up with a shell, beating Albanians to death with wood in order to save ammunition, allowing Albanian wounded in hospitals to starve to death, burning Albanian women and children tied to hay, throwing babies into the fires etc.

These crimes were all documented by both Serbian personel, European consuls, international reporters and even commissions in Europe who investigated these crimes.

In comparison to Albanians, who rarely or never killed Serbian civilians as Albanian “besa” (honor) forbade such things. Serbian former military personel who wrote books about the Balkan War stated that the Albanians always released Serbian prisoners of wars, while Serbian forces murdered all Albanian civilians constantly. During the so called Prochaska affair, the Serbian forces broke into Prochaskas house and bayonetted the consuls secretary, and then killed and raped the Albanian women and children hiding there.

Betrayal IV: Serbian Forces Kidnapping Albanian Women and Destroying Albanian VIllages After Having Been Given Food

In 1915, during the so called “Serbian Retreat”, prior to the Serbian defeat by the Austrians and Bulgaians, the Serbian military were given food by local Albanian civilians in both Kosovo and Macedonia, as a sign of peace. The Serbs ate the food, and then set fire to the villages and kidnapped women. Then they shelled the villages.

Betrayal V: The Mobilization and Killing of Albanian Conscripts in 1945

In 1945, following the re-establishment of Yugoslav authority in Kosovo by forces operating under the banner of the Yugoslav Partisans, Albanian accounts describe another episode perceived as a profound betrayal. Young Albanian men were reportedly mobilized and instructed to join military units under the pretext of pursuing retreating German forces moving northward. Participation was presented as a temporary military duty rather than forced conscription.

According to survivor testimonies and later historical investigations, Albanian recruits were initially issued weapons but were subsequently disarmed during their march toward Tivar (Bar). They were allegedly deprived of food and water and subjected to harsh treatment by Serbo-Montenegrin guards. Reports indicate that when some conscripts attempted to resist or flee, they were beaten, humiliated, and killed. Eyewitness accounts describe instances in which fleeing Albanians were shot from behind, while others were killed in confined spaces, including tunnels, allegedly through the use of hand grenades.

This episode—commonly referred to in Albanian historiography as the Tivar Massacre—has become emblematic of Albanian perceptions of post-war Yugoslav repression and duplicity. It further reinforced collective memories of betrayal associated with Serbian and Yugoslav authorities and contributed to the enduring distrust reflected in Albanian oral tradition and historical narrative.

Additional Episodes Commonly Cited in Albanian Historical Memory

Beyond the previously discussed cases, Albanian historiography and oral tradition frequently reference additional episodes interpreted as instances of systemic betrayal by Serbian or Yugoslav authorities. One such episode concerns the post-war reprisals of 1944–1946, during which thousands of Albanians were arrested, imprisoned, or executed under accusations of collaboration, often without due process. These actions disproportionately affected Kosovo Albanians and were perceived as collective punishment rather than individual accountability.

Another recurring narrative involves the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, when assurances of constitutional equality within Yugoslavia were replaced by centralized Serbian control. Albanian accounts emphasize that earlier promises of political representation, cultural rights, and linguistic equality were gradually undermined, reinforcing perceptions of deliberate deception.

Similarly, during the 1998–1999 conflict, diplomatic engagements and ceasefire agreements were widely viewed by Albanians as tactical maneuvers rather than genuine efforts toward peace, particularly in light of subsequent military escalations against civilian populations. These episodes collectively reinforced a long-standing interpretive framework in which Serbian state authority was associated with broken promises and coercive governance.

Analytical Discussion

From a historiographical perspective, the proverb “Shkaut besë s’i zihet” functions less as a literal ethnographic claim and more as a cultural shorthand for accumulated historical experience. It reflects a pattern of perceived asymmetry in power relations, in which formal assurances and political agreements were repeatedly followed by coercion, violence, or revocation of rights. Whether each individual episode withstands empirical scrutiny to the same degree is a legitimate subject of academic debate; however, the persistence of the proverb itself signals the depth of its resonance within Albanian collective memory.

Importantly, this discourse should not be interpreted as an essentialist judgment of an entire people, but rather as a culturally embedded response to historical trauma. In this sense, the proverb serves as a mnemonic device, preserving lessons drawn from past encounters with state power rather than expressing immutable ethnic hostility.

Conclusion

The endurance of the proverb “Shkaut besë s’i zihet” illustrates how collective memory, oral tradition, and historical experience intersect in shaping interethnic perceptions. Across multiple political eras—Ottoman collapse, Balkan wars, Yugoslav statehood, and post-Yugoslav conflict—Albanians have interpreted repeated episodes of violence, broken assurances, and political reversals as evidence of systemic betrayal. While individual events warrant continued scholarly examination and critical reassessment, the proverb’s persistence underscores its role as a moral and historical framework through which Albanians have sought to interpret and transmit their past. Understanding this proverb, therefore, is essential not to endorsing its judgment, but to comprehending the depth of mistrust that continues to shape Albanian–Serbian relations.