Abstract

This article analyzes a central irony in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Greek nationalism: the privileging of Orthodox Christian solidarity over ethno-linguistic and demographic realities. Greek nationalists often aligned tactically with Slavic Orthodox actors—particularly Serbia—while opposing Albanian populations with whom Greeks shared deeper pre-Slavic Balkan ancestry and long-standing historical coexistence. Rooted in Byzantine universalism and Ottoman religious categorization, this strategy unintentionally facilitated Slavic nation-building in Macedonia and contributed to the erosion of Greek influence there. The article argues that Greek nationalism was undermined not by ignorance, but by an anachronistic conception of identity and power in an age increasingly defined by modern ethnonationalism.

Introduction: Nationalism and Historical Irony in the Balkans

The Balkans in the nineteenth century constituted what Eric Hobsbawm famously called a “laboratory of nationalism,” where emerging national movements competed to define peoplehood, territory, and historical legitimacy.

Greek nationalism occupied a paradoxical position within this environment. While it adopted the language of modern nationalism, it remained deeply embedded in pre-modern frameworks inherited from Byzantium and the Ottoman millet system.

The irony explored here is that Greek nationalists frequently identified Slavic Orthodox populations as allies and Albanian populations as adversaries, despite the latter’s closer paleo-Balkan origins and cultural proximity. This inversion of ethnic logic had lasting consequences for the Macedonian question and for Balkan geopolitics more broadly.

Greek Nationalism and the Byzantine Inheritance

Greek nationalism differed structurally from other Balkan national movements. As Paschalis Kitromilides notes, it emerged “not merely as an ethnic revival, but as a civilizational claim rooted in the memory of Byzantium.”

Greek elites understood themselves as heirs to the Eastern Roman Empire, viewing Orthodoxy and Greek culture as mutually reinforcing markers of legitimacy.

Within the Ottoman Empire, Greek-speaking Orthodox elites dominated ecclesiastical and educational institutions. This fostered the belief that Greek language and culture constituted the natural apex of Orthodox civilization. Consequently, Greek nationalism retained an imperial imagination, even as it sought to operate within the nation-state system.

Orthodoxy as a Strategic Miscalculation

Greek nationalists were not unaware of Russian pan-Slavism or Serbian ambitions. However, they misjudged the transformation of Orthodoxy from a universal religious framework into a nationalized instrument of state power.

For Slavic actors, Orthodoxy was increasingly subordinated to nationality. As Barbara Jelavich observes, “the church became a servant of the nation, not its master.” Language, schooling, and demographic consolidation were prioritized over religious hierarchy.

Greek elites, by contrast, continued to assume that Orthodoxy would ensure cultural loyalty. This reflected what Benedict Anderson would describe as a failure to grasp the power of “imagined communities” based on vernacular language rather than sacred tradition. The result was a profound strategic asymmetry.

Macedonia and the Consequences of Orthodox Alignment

Macedonia—ethnically, linguistically, and confessionally diverse—became the focal point of this miscalculation. Greek policy emphasized ecclesiastical allegiance to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a marker of Greek identity, while Serbian and Bulgarian strategies focused on schools, administration, and linguistic normalization.

After the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), Serbian control over Vardar Macedonia led to systematic policies of national integration. As Mark Mazower notes, “religious commonality proved no obstacle to the aggressive assertion of linguistic and national conformity.” Greek cultural presence, dependent on ecclesiastical structures, was rapidly marginalized.

Albanians as the “Wrong Enemy”

The contrast with Albanian nationalism is particularly revealing. Albanians, despite religious fragmentation (Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic), developed a nationalism that subordinated religion to language and shared ancestry. As Miranda Vickers writes, “Albanian identity was consciously constructed as trans-confessional.”

Greeks and Albanians shared pre-Slavic Balkan ancestry, centuries of coexistence and extensive cultural and economic interaction.

Yet Greek nationalists often framed Albanians primarily as Muslims or Ottoman collaborators, rather than as potential ethno-historical partners. This misalignment led Greece to oppose a population with deep regional roots while enabling Slavic national projects that would later dominate contested territories.

Imperial Nationalism: An Interpretive Contribution

This article proposes the concept of imperial nationalism to explain Greek strategic failure. Imperial nationalism attempts to reconcile modern national claims with imperial civilizational hierarchy. It assumes that historical prestige guarantees political authority, cultural superiority ensures assimilation, legitimacy flows from antiquity rather than institutions.

Modern ethnonationalism, by contrast, prioritizes demography, language standardization, and bureaucratic control.

Greek nationalism faltered because it treated history as a substitute for state power. Serbian and Bulgarian nationalisms treated history as a narrative instrument, not as a guarantee.

Conclusion

The Greek nationalist alignment with Slavic Orthodox actors against Albanian populations was not merely a diplomatic error, but a structural failure rooted in an outdated conception of identity. By privileging Orthodoxy over ethno-linguistic realism, Greek nationalism facilitated Slavic consolidation in Macedonia and undermined its own strategic position.

The irony is therefore not accidental but systemic: a nationalism shaped by imperial memory was outmaneuvered by nationalisms grounded in modern ethnography, language, and statecraft. This episode illustrates the broader dangers of mistaking cultural prestige for political power in the age of nation-states.

Footnotes

1. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 67.

2. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 23.

3. Dimitri Kitsikis, The Balkan Orthodox Commonwealth (Athens: Estia, 2007), 112.

4. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 91.

5. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), 36–44.

6. Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 52–60.

7. Mark Mazower, The Balkans (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 112.

8. Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 15.

9. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 179–183.