By: Nehat Hyseni

This analytical review addresses the systematic degradation of authentic political representation of Albanians in the Preševo Valley through a case study of the political entity known as the Alternative for Change (APN). The central argument is that APN has evolved from a nominally Albanian political subject into a functional instrument of Serbian state interests at the local level, through coalitions with Serbian parties, political adaptation to Belgrade, and the marginalization of Western initiatives aimed at the protection of human rights.

This analysis demonstrates that the current political dynamics in the Preshevo Valley are no longer characterized by Albanian political pluralism, but rather by a fundamental division between two political paradigms:

(1) an integrative, Serbophile model of governance based on loyalty and conformity; and

(2) a pro-Western, rights-based approach grounded in international standards and the active involvement of U.S. institutions, including House Resolution HR 6411.

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1. CONTEXT: THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS OF ALBANIAN REPRESENTATION

For decades, Albanians in the Preshevo Valley have faced systemic discrimination: institutional under-representation, economic exclusion, violations of linguistic and cultural rights, and the absence of equality before the law. Within this reality, Albanian political actors have traditionally played a dual role: electoral representation and international political advocacy.

Since 2015, however, a serious deviation from this role has become evident. Part of the Albanian political elite has abandoned a rights-based approach and embraced a model of adaptation to the Serbian political order, replacing political representation with the management of the status quo.

APN represents the clearest and most consolidated case of this transformation.

2. THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF APN: PRAGMATISM WITHOUT SUBSTANCE

From its inception, APN failed to construct a political platform based on:

• collective protection of Albanian rights;

• strategic coordination with regional Albanian actors (Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, etc.);

• a clear and credible Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Instead, it promoted an ambiguous discourse of so-called “local pragmatism,” which in practice resulted in:

• acceptance of Serbian discriminatory structures as a form of submissive adaptation by Albanians;

• avoidance of institutional confrontation with the Serbian government;

• depoliticization of ethnic inequality.

This “political pragmatism” produced neither structural reforms nor measurable improvements in the position of Albanians; rather, it directly contributed to the normalization of discrimination.

3. CIVIC DELEGITIMIZATION AND THE LOSS OF THE ALBANIAN BASE

The loss of public support for APN in Preshevo was a direct consequence of:

• the absence of concrete results;

• strategic ambiguity and covert activities aimed at altering the demographic structure of the Municipality of Preshevo through the implementation of the so-called “Action Plan” for the settlement of migrants from the Middle East (Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.);

• widespread public perception and conviction that this political subject no longer represented the collective Albanian interest—on the contrary.

This clear exposure and civic delegitimization transformed APN from a representative political actor into a political structure stripped of Albanian ethnic legitimacy, pushing it to seek support outside the Albanian electorate, often through public praise of Serbia’s anti-Albanian President, Aleksandar Vučić.

4. POLITICAL REPOSITIONING OF APN: ALLIANCES WITH SERBIAN PARTIES

Rather than engaging in reflection and reform, APN chose strategic repositioning through open alignment with Serbian parties, particularly in the Municipality of Bujanovac.

This coalition:

• was not built on the principle of political equality;

• was not accompanied by guarantees for Albanian rights;

• failed to produce mechanisms of institutional accountability.

Instead, it institutionalized the political subordination of Albanian representation, transforming local governance into a functional extension of Belgrade’s policies.

5. CONTINUITY OF PRO-SERBIAN GOVERNANCE

The current structure of local power in Bujanovac does not represent political change, but rather continuity of the same governing model. Within this model:

• local institutions function as administrators of stability;

• Albanian actors operate as intermediaries rather than political representatives;

• structural conflicts are kept unresolved through political pacification.

This model produces short-term stability for the Serbian state, but long-term stagnation and discrimination for the Albanian community.

6. TWO ALBANIAN POLITICAL PARADIGMS IN THE PRESHEVO VALLEY

6.1. The Integrative-Serbophile Paradigm

This paradigm:

• accepts Serbian political dominance as unchangeable;

• replaces real equality with formal integration;

• conditions local power on political loyalty to Serbia.

APN is the most consistent representative—and currently the only Albanian political party in the Municipality of Bujanovac and the Preshevo Valley—that embodies this so-called “pragmatic” approach.

6.2. The Pro-Western, Rights-Based Paradigm

This paradigm includes all Albanian political parties in the Preshevo Valley, excluding APN, and:

• is grounded in international human rights standards;

• actively engages U.S. and European institutions;

• views HR 6411 as a political instrument for eliminating systemic discrimination.

This approach frames the Albanian issue in the Valley primarily as a democratic problem, not as an internal ethnic matter of Serbia.

7. APN AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF HR 6411

One of the most telling indicators of APN’s true political orientation is its lack of active support for international initiatives addressing discrimination against Albanians. Instead of lobbying and international cooperation, APN has chosen silence and relativization.

In political analysis, silence constitutes a political position. In this case, it represents tacit consent to the continuation of discrimination.

8. BETRAYAL AS AN INSTITUTIONAL CATEGORY

In political theory, betrayal is not limited to overt acts of hostility. It often manifests through:

• abandonment of representative responsibility;

• instrumentalization of power for personal gain;

• active or passive servility toward dominant structures.

According to these criteria, APN’s political conduct constitutes institutional betrayal of the Albanian community it claims to represent.

9. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY

The case of APN illustrates the danger of utilizing conformist minority elites to:

• neutralize legitimate demands for Albanian rights in Serbia;

• project the illusion of democratic inclusion of Albanians within institutions;

• preserve existing discriminatory structures.

For this reason, international actors must:

• distinguish formal representation from genuine advocacy;

• engage directly with rights-based political actors;

• condition support on measurable progress toward ethnic equality.

CONCLUSION

The case of APN serves as a strategic warning. It demonstrates how political representation can be emptied of national substance and transformed into an instrument of control by Serbia.

If Albanians in the Preshevo Valley are to remain political subjects rather than objects of administration, international support must be oriented toward principled representation, not toward managed stability that serves a discriminatory government at the expense of Albanian national and human rights interests.

Preshevo, February 10, 2026