Serbian Orthodox Fundamentalism: The Sacralization of Nationalism in Contemporary Processions and Its Historical Links to Chetnik Irredentism
Abstract
Serbian Orthodox fundamentalism represents a potent fusion of religious identity and ethno-nationalist ideology, wherein Orthodoxy is positioned as the sacral core of Serbian national belonging. This article examines a recent public procession in Serbia—captured in a widely circulated video—as a contemporary manifestation of this phenomenon. It analyzes how such events, featuring large crosses and icons of Serbian saints carried by self-described “patriots,” revive Chetnik legacies of irredentism and contribute to the perpetuation of inter-ethnic animosity toward Muslims, Albanians, Croats, and other non-Serbian groups. Drawing on historical and contemporary sources, the analysis underscores the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in legitimizing these dynamics and their implications for Balkan stability.
Introduction
In March 2026, a video posted by the account RadioGenoa depicted a nighttime march in Serbia in which hundreds of participants, many wearing high-visibility vests and linking arms, processed through city streets while carrying an oversized wooden cross illuminated against the dark sky, alongside banners bearing icons of Orthodox saints and Serbian national flags. The accompanying caption—“In Serbia and other nations, patriots march with crosses”—framed the event as a wholesome display of Christian patriotism.
Yet this spectacle exemplifies a deeper pattern of Serbian Orthodox fundamentalism: the public ritualization of ethno-religious identity that blurs the line between faith and nationalist mobilization. Such processions, often termed litije in Orthodox tradition, have long served both devotional and political purposes. In the Serbian context, they function as vehicles for irredentist claims and the reinforcement of historical grievances, frequently fueling hostility toward neighboring ethnic and religious communities.
This article situates the video within the broader framework of Serbian religious nationalism, tracing its roots to the SOC’s historical symbiosis with state power, its endorsement of Chetnik ideology during World War II, and its post-Yugoslav revival. It argues that these movements sacralize Greater Serbia irredentism while demonizing Muslims, Albanians, and Croats as existential threats, thereby sustaining cycles of mistrust in the Balkans.
Historical Foundations: Orthodoxy as the Sacralization of Serbian Identity
Christos Mylonas’s seminal study Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals posits that Orthodoxy constitutes the “sacralisation of the Serbian national identity,” forging collective belonging through myth, liturgy, and differentiation from non-Orthodox “others.”
This process, often labeled Svetosavlje (Saint-Savaism) after the medieval founder of the autocephalous Serbian Church, elevates Saint Sava as both spiritual and national patron. Under Ottoman rule and later Yugoslav communism, the SOC preserved Serbian distinctiveness; in the late twentieth century, it actively supported Slobodan Milošević’s nationalist project, republishing pseudohistorical texts that portrayed Orthodoxy as the essence of Serbianness.
The fundamentalist discourse identified by Mylonas is not merely devotional but reactive: it constructs a primordial Serbian essence threatened by Catholicism, Islam, and secularism. This worldview found violent expression in the Chetnik movement of World War II.
Chetnik Legacies and Clerical Nationalism
The Chetniks—formally the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland—were a royalist, Serbian-nationalist guerrilla force led by Draža Mihailović. While ostensibly anti-Axis, they pursued a Greater Serbia agenda through systematic ethnic cleansing. Jozo Tomasevich documents that approximately three-quarters of Orthodox clergy supported the Chetniks, with some priests serving as unit commanders; the SOC hierarchy provided ideological sanction, framing the struggle as a defense of Orthodoxy against “Ustaša-Croat” and “Muslim” threats.
Chetnik forces massacred Muslim civilians in Bosnia and Sandžak, throwing bodies into the Drina River and destroying mosques, actions justified through Christoslavic mythology that cast Muslims as historical oppressors and Christ-killers.
Post-1945 communist suppression temporarily marginalized Chetnik memory, but the 1980s–1990s wars revived it. The SOC canonized certain Chetnik figures as martyrs, and neo-Chetnik groups reemerged, often under the banner of “Ravna Gora” commemorations. Michael Sells’s The Bridge Betrayed demonstrates how SOC clergy and media revived Ottoman-era grievances to portray Bosnian Muslims and Croats as eternal enemies, sacralizing violence during the Bosnian War.
Contemporary Manifestations: Processions, Irredentism, and Othering
The 2026 procession in the RadioGenoa video—complete with towering crosses, saintly icons, and Serbian tricolors—echoes these traditions. Participants, including young men in traditional headwear and civilians chanting in unison, embody the “patriotic” fusion of faith and nation. Similar litije have been politicized elsewhere; in Montenegro, for instance, they opposed perceived threats to Serbian Orthodox interests, mobilizing against government policies seen as anti-Serb.
These events are inextricably linked to irredentism. The SOC continues to view Kosovo as “Serbian Jerusalem,” a sacred heartland whose loss in 2008 fueled revanchist rhetoric. Far-right groups such as Dveri, Obraz, and People’s Patrol—often aligned with clerical nationalism—exploit Orthodox symbolism to advocate Eurasianist alliances with Russia and oppose “Western” multiculturalism.
Metropolitan Joanikije’s 2025 praise of Chetnik leader Pavle Đurišić, a convicted perpetrator of Muslim massacres, illustrates institutional tolerance for revisionism.
Crucially, such symbolism fuels hatred. Public discourse in these circles equates Albanian Muslims (and even Christian Albanians in Kosovo) with Ottoman legacy and “jihad”; Croats are cast as “Ustaša” heirs tied to Vatican influence.
Replies to the original video exemplify this: critics labeled the marchers “Chetnik scumbags” and “fake Christians” who weaponize Orthodoxy to justify anti-Croat and anti-Albanian violence, citing historical massacres even against Orthodox Albanians.
This othering is not incidental but structural: by sacralizing Serbian victimhood, the movement delegitimizes neighboring claims and normalizes exclusionary rhetoric.
Conclusion
The procession documented in the 2026 video is no isolated folk custom but a living embodiment of Serbian Orthodox fundamentalism. By reviving Chetnik aesthetics and irredentist myths, it perpetuates a worldview in which Orthodoxy legitimizes territorial ambitions and ethnic antagonism.
While defenders invoke religious freedom, scholarly analysis reveals a pattern of clerical-nationalist symbiosis that has historically enabled violence and continues to obstruct reconciliation. Addressing this requires critical engagement by the SOC and international actors alike, lest symbolic marches harden into renewed conflict. Future research should examine the role of digital platforms in amplifying these narratives and their intersection with Russian Orthodox influences.
References
Mylonas, Christos. Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Ever-Elusive Identity. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003.
Sells, Michael A. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Tomasevich, Jozo. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.
“The Serbian Orthodox Church and Extreme-Right Groups: A Marriage of Convenience or Organic Partnership?” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University, July 14, 2023. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-serbian-orthodox-church-and-extreme-right-groups-a-marriage-of-convenience-or-organic-partnership.
Mulaosmanović, Admir. “Islam and Muslims in Greater Serbian Ideology: The Origins of an Antagonism and the Misuse of the Past.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 39, no. 3 (2019): 410–426.
Additional primary source: RadioGenoa (@RadioGenoa). “In Serbia and other nations, patriots march with crosses.” X post, March 28, 2026. https://x.com/i/status/2037681531053916398. This article draws exclusively on verifiable scholarly and historical sources to provide a balanced yet critical academic assessment.
