by Elis Buba
The history, forgery and the role of Pjetër Bogdani
I. When history becomes a political weapon
Few events in Balkan history have been manipulated as carefully and deliberately as the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and two major “migrations” that occurred three centuries later — that of 1690 and that of 1737. These events have been transformed over time from historical facts into foundational myths of Serbian nationalism, where the truth has been systematically sacrificed on the altar of territorial claims.
British scholar Noel Malcolm, one of the most respected authors of Balkan history, has undertaken a rigorous analysis of these events, casting methodological doubt on official Serbian narratives and restoring the central role of Albanians to the center of the discourse — as historical actors, not as passive subjects of history.
II. Battle of Kosovo 1389: Balkan Coalition, not the “Serbian Army”
2.1 The myth of exclusively Serbian heroism
Serbian historiography has carefully constructed the narrative that the Battle of Kosovo was a “Serbian” battle against the Ottoman invaders — a national sacrifice of Tsar Lazar and his people. This narrative, crystallized during the 19th and 20th centuries as a tool of irredentism, has little support in historical reality.
The truth is completely different: what confronted the Ottoman forces under the command of Sultan Murad I on the fields of Kosovo was a multinational Balkan coalition — an alliance forced by circumstances, not an expression of any collective “Serbian” identity.
2.2 Composition of the coalition
The Christian coalition forces included:
- Serbian Principality under Tsar Lazar of Hrebeljanović — main power, but not the only one
- Kingdom of Bosnia under Tvrtko I, who sent his contingents under the command of voivode Vlatko Vuković
- Albanian princes George II Balsha and Theodore II Muzaka — but especially John Kastrioti (father of Skanderbeg) and other Albanian tribes of the area
- Wallachian and Bulgarian contingents, as well as other fighters from the region
The study of Ottoman, Byzantine, and Western sources of the period does not support the thesis of an exclusively “Serbian” mission. This was a last-ditch attempt by Balkan feudal lords to halt the Ottoman advance — and it ultimately failed.
In the battle of Fushë-Kosovo between the army of the Balkan defensive coalition and the invading Turkish-Ottoman army (twice as large as the coalition), the troops led by Gjergji II Balsha of Shkodra and Teodor II Muzaka of Berat stood out in particular… The battle fought near Pristina on June 15, 1389 was one of the most terrible that the human eye had ever seen on these lands. Although an Albanian named Milosh Kopilić deported to the Sultan’s tent and killed Murat I, the Turks managed to destroy the Balkan coalition. This bloody defeat paved the way for Sultan Bayezid, nicknamed “Lightning”, to further deport them to Albanian lands. The Balkan anti-Turkish-Ottoman coalition, despite all the struggle and great resistance, not only lost, but left behind a true tragedy for the fate of the peoples of the Balkans in general, and for the Albanian people and lands in particular.
2.3 Who Fought for Sultan Murad?
Surprisingly, and this is a detail that Serbian historiography prefers to avoid, Albanian tribes also fought on the Ottoman side during this battle. Malcolm notes that the tradition according to which the Kelmendi clan was attributed with fighting for Sultan Murad in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 is “almost certainly incorrect” — but this fact alone shows how complex the real picture of alliances was at that time. The Albanians were not monolithic: they fought on both sides, according to local interests and feudal alliances, just as the Slavs did.
2.4 The death of Sultan Murat and the myth of Miloshin
The battle resulted in the death of Sultan Murad I — a true historical event — and the destruction of the coalition forces. The legend of Miloš Kopil, called Obilić as “the Sultan’s murderer,” later emerged as a national myth. But Tsar Lazarus also fell slain on the battlefield — not as a religious martyr of Christianity, as he was later portrayed, but as a militarily defeated feudal lord.
The Ottomans used the victory to consolidate their occupation of the Balkan peninsula over the following decades, until the entire region became an Ottoman province, also with the help of Serbian vassals.
2.5 Serbo-Ottoman Alliances: When Turks and Serbs Lined Up Together
Perhaps the most overlooked — and most troubling for the Serbian narrative — aspect of early Ottoman history is the fact that the relationship between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire was not that of adversary, but often that of loyal vassal and useful ally . The Serbian nobility, after the defeat of 1389, was organically integrated into Ottoman structures — as a source of military recruitment, as an administrative unit, and as an active fighting force.
This documented cooperation, which extended into the 16th century, does not negate the suffering that Serbs endured under Ottoman rule. But it does make the romantic narrative of “century-old resistance” — the narrative upon which contemporary territorial claims are built — untenable.
The integration of the Serbian nobility into Ottoman structures was not a unique phenomenon: Albanians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, and Bosniaks also followed the same pattern. But there is a fundamental difference: the historiography of other peoples has acknowledged this complexity, while the Serbian narrative has systematically concealed it, building contemporary territorial claims on “centuries-old resistance.”
When the Serbs fought with the Ottomans against the European crusaders at Nicopolis, they were not “indentured slaves” — they were functional vassals of a religious system that provided them with local rights, religious autonomy, and economic gain. When the Brankovićs refused to help Hunyadi in 1448, they were making a rational strategic choice — not treachery, but diplomacy.
This understanding — without anachronistic moralisms, but with historical rigor — is precisely what distinguishes serious historiography from national propaganda. And it is precisely this rigor that is missing when the history of Fushë-Kosovo and the “Displacements” is served as an argument for today’s claims about Kosovo.
III. Pjetër Bogdani: The Warrior Bishop and His Real Role
3.1 Who was Pjetër Bogdani?
Pjetër Bogdani (c. 1630–1689) is a central figure not only of Albanian culture — as the author of the first original prose work in the Albanian language, Cuneus prophetarum Çeta e profetëve (Padua, 1685) — but also of the political and military history of 17th-century Albanians.
As Archbishop of Skopje (with jurisdiction over the Catholic Christians of Kosovo and the surrounding area), Bogdan had a dual role: pastoral and diplomatic-political. He lived and operated within the Ottoman Empire, but regularly reported to Rome, sending intelligence on Ottoman military movements and systematically arguing for the need for European intervention to liberate the Catholic population.
Malcolm emphasizes that Bogdani “took active measures, at some risk to himself, to promote the cause of liberation from Ottoman rule.”
3.2 Bogdan and the Austrian army of 1689
When the Austrian army under the command of General Piccolomini penetrated Kosovo in October 1689, it was Pjetër Bogdani who was the first person to go to meet the general — not Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević, who was in Montenegro trying to convince his faithful to support Venice, not Vienna.
Contemporary sources — Austrian, English, and papal — clearly testify: when Piccolomini arrived in Prizren, 5,000 inhabitants came out to welcome him with festive shouts, led by their Archbishop — Peter Bogdan — carrying a banner with the image of the Holy Cross. Historian Camillo Contarini has documented this event clearly.
During the three days that Piccolomini spent with Bogdani in Prizren (before the general died of the plague), the recruitment of 20,000 local fighters for the Austrian cause was organized. Commander Veterani refers to “20,000 Arnauts brought under loyal obedience to the Emperor by Piccolomini.” Other Austro-Italian sources speak of “more than 20,000 Rashians, or Albanians.”
3.3 Who were these 20,000?
This is precisely the point where history and mythology radically diverge. Serbian historiography has claimed that those 20,000 were “Serbian insurgents.” But Malcolm’s analysis of primary sources shows something entirely different:
Prizren, the city where the negotiations took place, had about 10,000 families in 1670. According to Bogdan’s own report from 1681, only 30 of those families were Catholic. From earlier reports, Serbian Orthodox were about three times more numerous than Catholics — but the vast majority of the city’s inhabitants were Muslims, “almost all Albanians,” as stated in 17th-century sources.
Austrian officer Colonel von Strasser reported to Ludwig von Baden that Piccolomini went to Prizren “to talk with the Albanians, Arnauts and others.” The intercepted English document of January 19, 1690, found among Ludwig von Baden’s papers in Karlsruhe, reports that the Germans “have made contact with 20,000 Albanians (Albanois), who have turned their arms against the Turks.”
Malcolm’s conclusion is clear: the vast majority of those who gathered around Piccolomini in Prizren were, by our modern standards, Albanians — not Serbs.
3.4 Bogdan’s death and the consequences
Peter Bogdan died of the plague shortly after Piccolomini, in late 1689 or early 1690, without seeing the fruit of his sacrifice. The cause was continued by his successor, Thomas Raspasian. But with the collapse of the anti-Ottoman coalition and the Austrian retreat after the catastrophic defeat at Kaçanik (January 2, 1690), what followed was a double tragedy: both militarily and demographically.
IV. “The Great Serbian Migration” — History and Myth
4.1 Two events, one narrative
The concept of the “Great Serbian Migration” (Serbian: Velika Seoba Srba ) refers to two events:
- 1690 — population evacuation after the Austrian army was defeated at Kaçanik and retreated
- 1737 — second departure during the Austro-Ottoman wars of that year
Serbian historiography presents both as evidence of the “emptying” of Kosovo by Serbs — which, according to this narrative, was then filled by Muslim Albanians. This claim has served as a key argument for Serbian territorial claims over Kosovo.
4.2 What the main source says: Arsenije III himself
The central claim of the Serbian narrative — that tens of thousands of families left with Patriarch Arsenije III — unravels upon reading the primary documents.
Arsenije III Crnojević himself left two documents with his figures:
- At the end of 1690: “more than 30,000 souls”
- Six years later: “more than 40,000 souls”
So, the Patriarch himself speaks of souls (individuals), not families. But Serbian historiography transformed this figure into “37,000 families” — thanks to a monastery chronicle by monk Stefan Ravaničanini, written 28 years after the events. This error (or forgery) was added by historian Pavle Julinac in 1765, copied by Jovan Rajić (1794-5), passed on to Johann von Engel (1802) and established as Western “historiographic truth.”
The consequence of this substitution “souls → families”: if each family has an average of 10-15 people, 37,000 families become 370,000-555,000 people. Some Serbian writers reached the figure of 500,000 — even 800,000 people (Stojačković, 1860). A 19th-century historian claimed that 80,000 families left.
Malcolm sums it up clearly: “His [Arsenije’s] demands are the most authoritative statements we have, and they clearly specify souls, not families.”
4.3 Arsenije — Political leader or insecure refugee?
The Serbian narrative presents Arseniye as the main leader of the anti-Ottoman coalition from the very beginning. But Malcolm shows that this is not true:
Arsenije was in Montenegro during the entire period that Piccolomini was in Kosovo — negotiating with Venice, not Austria. He returned to Kosovo only a few weeks after Piccolomini was already dead. After the defeat at Kaçanik, Arsenije left in haste, while most of the population remained: “No one could leave Prizren or Peja; everyone remained there as prey to the barbarian,” wrote a contemporary.
Arsenije went to Belgrade, where he spent most of the summer. A record of the June 1690 assembly of Serbian clergy in Belgrade lists names from many parts of the Serbian lands — but from Kosovo only the Patriarch himself. Then, those who were there moved towards Hungary.
4.4 Who were those who fled?
Even if we accept Arseniye’s figures (30,000-40,000 individuals), who were they?
Malcolm’s analysis of the lists of Serbian residents in Buda-Komarom after 1690 shows that they came from many parts of the Serbian lands — from Central Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bulgaria — not exclusively from Kosovo. According to Dušan Popović’s detailed analysis, only about 22% of the Serbian families registered in Buda and Buda were of Kosovar origin.
Also, even among those who left, Malcolm identifies individuals marked as “Arnauts” — Albanians — indicating that the departure was not exclusively Serbian.
4.5 Why did the myth of “displacements” grow?
Malcolm makes a brilliant analysis of ideological motives:
Phase I (18th century): Serbs in Habsburg territory needed to justify their special privileges (granted by Leopold I). The greater the number of immigrants, the stronger the claims against Austria.
Phase II (19th century): Belgrade’s Serbian nationalism sought a territorial argument for Kosovo. Its “emptying” of Serbs and “filling” with Albanians served as an irredentist justification.
Phase III (19th-20th centuries): Western historiography copied Serbian sources uncritically. English, German and American academic texts propagated inflated figures, transforming 30,000-40,000 individuals displaced (from many areas, not just Kosovo) into “200,000 Serbs displaced from Kosovo” (Sugar, 1977) or “30,000-40,000 families” (Clissold/Cambridge University Press, 1968).
V. The 1737 Migration and the Kelmends
5.1 The second event
The second major migration occurred during the Austrian campaign of 1737. The Kelmends of the Peshter plain joined their mountain brethren (and many other clans, including Slavic Orthodox ones), rising in support of the Austrians. They were then forced to retreat northward in the wake of the Austrian army, suffering heavy losses.
5.2 The role of the Kelmenda Albanians
The significance of this event lies in the fact that in 1737, as in 1690, the Albanian clans were central protagonists — not secondary actors. Malcolm shows that with the exodus and uprising of 1737, “the Albanian clans had been a formidable power that could strike deep into the territories of Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo” — a power that was never recovered thereafter.
Even the Orthodox Patriarch himself left accompanied by the Kelmend clans — a detail that shows that the departure of 1737 was not exclusively “Serbian.”
VI. Demographic consequences: What really happened to Kosovo?
If Kosovo had “emptied” its Serbs in 1690, how does one explain the fact that even in 1737 there was still a significant population that could have left? And how does one explain that an Albanian majority in Kosovo only became established during the middle decades of the 19th century — nearly 150 years after 1690?
Malcolm offers the demographic explanation: the processes were slow and complex. There were:
- Local departure, then return
- Slow Albanian migration from the Highlands
- Slow Serbian migration from other areas
- Urbanization and natural growth
The Serbian claim of immediate “emptying-filling” does not hold up historically. Bogdani himself, in his 1681 report, indicates that in Peja, Serbs had only 100 families and Muslims 1,000 — so demographic inequalities existed even before 1690.
VII. What does history teach?
Malcolm’s analysis brings several fundamental conclusions:
1. The battle of 1389 was coalitional. It was not an exclusively Serbian battle. Albanians, Bosniaks, Vlachs, and others fought alongside the Serbs. The “ethnic” meaning of this battle was constructed a posteriori by the national romanticism of the 19th century.
2. Bogdan, not Arseniye, was the protagonist of 1689. The primary documents are clear: The Albanian Catholic Archbishop Peter Bogdan was the one who gathered and organized 5,000 and then 20,000 fighters. Arseniye arrived after the death of Piccolomini.
3. The “Great Migration” of 1690 was predominantly Albanian. The demographic base of Prizren and Kosovo was predominantly Albanian. The warriors gathered by Bogdan were, according to most sources, Albanian. Even those who left included Albanians.
4. The “Displacement” figures are historically inflated. 30,000-40,000 individuals (not families) were displaced in total from the entire wider area — not just Kosovo. Most Western historiography has copied errors and falsifications from 18th-19th century Serbian sources.
5. The “Great Serbian Migration” hoax has served as a political weapon. Malcolm accurately shows how each “correction” of this narrative was motivated by concrete political interests — whether Serb claims to Austria for privileges, or Serbian irredentism towards Kosovo.
The importance of historical review
Noel Malcolm constructs his analysis not as a polemic, but as a rigorous historical reconstruction. He acknowledges that Albanian historiography has also made its own exaggerations.
But what emerges clearly from his study is that the dominant narrative — the Serbian one, adopted by many Western academics — does not stand up to the evidence. Pjetër Bogdani was not a secondary character in Balkan-European history: he was the main strategist and organizer of the anti-Ottoman resistance of 1689, the last and heroic, at the cost of his life.
The great demographic displacement of 1690 happened — but not as the Serbian narrative presents it. Those who left were mostly Albanians. Those who organized the departure were not Serbs. And the numbers, as Arsenije III himself points out with his own hand, were never “37,000 families.”
History, when read correctly, does not do any justice to today’s territorial claims over Kosovo. / Prepared by Elis Buba / usalbanianmediagroup.com
References
Noel Malcolm, “Rebels, Believers, Survivors: Studies in the History of the Albanians”, Oxford University Press, 2020 —
Chapters: “The Kelmendi: Notes on a Catholic Albanian Clan”; “The ‘Great Migration’ of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690): History, Myth and Ideology”; “Peter Bogdani’s Cuneus prophetarum (1685) and its Context”.
Secondary sources , for further reading
- Fine, John VA, The Late Medieval Balkans
- Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History
- Babinger, Franz, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time
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