The Albanian Proverb and Critiques of the Serbian Orthodox Church: “Mus i besoni popave mjekerzez”
Introduction
“Mus i besoni popave mjekerzez” (roughly translated as “Do not believe the lies of your black-bearded priests”) is an Albanian proverb that has circulated in Kosovo and among Albanians as a pointed critique of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and its destructive influence on Serbian society. The saying targets what some perceive as the Church’s role in perpetuating narratives of Serbian victimhood, nationalism, and interfaith suspicion. This article examines the proverb’s underlying claims, the SOC’s historical and contemporary influence, and documented criticisms regarding its political engagement.
The Proverb’s Message and Context
According to interpretations in Albanian discourse, the proverb warns against trusting Serbian Orthodox clergy — recognizable by their traditional black beards and robes — whom it accuses of maintaining a system of ideological control. Key elements include:
Promoting a narrative of perpetual Serbian martyrdom against “Turks” (Ottomans/historical Muslims), Albanians, Catholics, and the West/NATO.
Indirectly fostering religious and ethnic hatred through sermons emphasizing victimhood and pan-Slavic irredentism, imperialism and chauvinism (Russian irrdentism).
Acting as an elite class with significant wealth, political access, and social control, funded partly by taxpayers while ordinary citizens face economic hardship.
Critics contrast this with religious leaders among Albanians (Muslim imams and Catholic priests) and Bosniaks, who avoid systematic anti-Serb propaganda from the pulpit.
The Serbian Orthodox Church: Influence and Wealth
The SOC is one of the most influential institutions in Serbia and among Serb communities in the region. It maintains close historical ties to the state and national identity. In the modern era, it has enjoyed privileges including large church construction projects, often supported by public funds. Critics argue this creates an elite clergy with high living standards amid broader socioeconomic challenges in Serbia.
The Church has actively engaged in politics, particularly during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Many bishops and priests supported Serb positions in the 1990s conflicts, framing them as defensive struggles for survival. This involvement has drawn accusations of complicity in nationalist mobilization. The Serbian Orthodox Church also passively allowed Serbian priests and religious leaders to “bless” Serbian war criminals.
Criticisms of Complicity and Controversial Actions
Human rights organizations and observers have leveled serious accusations against elements of the SOC:
Support for Political and Military Leaders
During the 1990s, some Church figures publicly backed Slobodan Milošević and Bosnian Serb leaders. Reports document instances of clergy appearing with figures later convicted of war crimes, including blessings or symbolic support.
Srebrenica and War Crimes
The SOC has faced criticism for its response to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre (recognized as genocide by the ICTY and International Court of Justice). While some Church leaders have condemned crimes, the institution as a whole has often rejected the “genocide” label, emphasizing Serb suffering instead. Documented cases include clergy blessing troops or paramilitaries involved in operations.
Victimhood Narratives
Critics, including in Albanian and Bosniak circles, argue that the Church amplifies historical grievances (e.g., Ottoman era, WWII Jasenovac, 1990s conflicts) in ways that hinder reconciliation and justify maximalist territorial or political claims, such as regarding Kosovo. The SOC rejects these characterizations, portraying itself as a “defender of Serb rights” and spiritual continuity against “perceived historical persecution”. The Serbian church however refuses to even mention the Serbian atrocities against Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians, Hungarians and even Montenegrins. The church refuses to mention the Serbian destruction of the Montenegrin church heritage in 1919. etc.
Broader Implications
The proverb encapsulates a deep Albanian skepticism rooted in th Serbian-Albanian conflict and competing national historiographies. Albanians largely view the SOC as an instrument of Serbian state policy aimed at undermining Albanian aspirations for independence. Similar sentiments exist among some Croats and Bosniaks.
Conclusion
“Mus i besoni popave mjekerzez” is more than folklore; it is a cultural expression of distrust born from Serbian massacres, atrocities and Serbian church oppression and hatred against other religions. The Serbian Orthodox Church undeniably wields significant soft power in shaping Serbian identity and politics. The Serbian church cannot continue giving birth to inter-ethnic hatred, lies and propaganda.
References
Arandjelovic, D. The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Transnational Political Actor. Clemson University, 2022.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Various indictments and judgments (e.g., Srebrenica-related).
Society for Threatened Peoples (GFBV). Reports on SOC involvement (2005 documentation).
Dusan Arandjelovic, “The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Transnational Political Actor” (Clemson University Thesis, 2022). Examines the SOC’s role as a political force beyond Serbia’s borders, including its influence on nationalism and close ties to the state.
Georgetown University Berkley Center: “Religion as a Political Vehicle: An Examination of the Influence of Orthodoxy in Serbia by Russia” (2020). Analyzes how the SOC serves as a vehicle for nationalist and external (Russian) political interests, intertwining faith with anti-Western sentiment.
Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović, various works on the SOC in the 1990s (published in journals such as Nationalities Papers or Religion, State & Society). These scholars document the Church’s alignment with Milošević-era policies and its framing of conflicts as existential threats to Serbs.
Society for Threatened Peoples (GFBV), Germany (2005 report and documentation): Details specific cases of SOC clergy blessing troops and paramilitaries involved in Bosnian operations, including near Srebrenica, and Patriarch Pavle’s associations with indicted figures. Describes the Church as “mired in the genocide of Bosnian Muslims.”
International Crisis Group and Helsinki Committee reports (1990s–2000s): Multiple briefings on the SOC’s nationalist mobilization, opposition to Dayton compromises, and role in sustaining rejectionist narratives regarding Kosovo and Bosnia.
European Union and U.S. State Department religious freedom / human rights reports: Occasionally note the SOC’s privileged position in Serbia, taxpayer-funded projects, and influence over education and public discourse on history.
Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford University Press, 2002). A detailed study showing how the SOC actively contributed to the rise of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s–1990s through publications, sermons, and alliances with political elites.
Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Serbian Orthodox Church” in Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Duke University Press, 1998) and her later works. Ramet analyzes the Church’s privileged position, financial benefits, and role in framing Serbs as perpetual victims of Catholics, Muslims, and the West.
Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Cornell University Press, 2009). Discusses the SOC’s resistance to transitional justice, denialist tendencies regarding Srebrenica, and continued influence on public memory.
Dubravka Stojanović and others in Serbian historiography critiques (e.g., publications from the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia). These highlight Church-backed textbook narratives emphasizing martyrdom and external threats.
