Kosovo was not an integral part of the state of the south slavs: Yugoslavia

Kosovo was never an integral part of the state of the south slavs: Yugoslavia

by Shefqet Cakiqi-Llapashtica

Kosovo has been suffering from this since its war of liberation until today, being confronted with courts established on the basis of erroneous UN postulates. Since 1995, due to the Russian and Chinese veto, Serbia and its war were not designated as aggression, from which Serbia benefited the most. The classification of Serbian aggression in former Yugoslavia as an “internal conflict” and “civil war” by the UN Security Council relieved Serbia of responsibility.

The anti-colonial and liberation war of Kosovo was classified in the same way—as an “internal conflict” and “civil war”—equating Kosovo as a voluntary part of former Yugoslavia from 1912 until 1999.

The Board of Peace is an international organization that seeks to promote stability, restore credible and legitimate governance, and ensure sustainable peace in areas affected or threatened by wars.

In our case, we agree that the former world order, under the umbrella of the UN, was not in our favor nor in favor of justice.

The idea of the Republic of Kosovo, the colonial status of Kosovo, the anti-colonial liberation war, genocide, the aggressor, and the lack of knowledge about Kosovo

From documents of the Archive of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1940): Kosovo was classified as a colony.

In the Archive of Yugoslavia, the fund of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, file 1940/14–12, together with the “Theses on the National Question” prepared by Moša Pijade for the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and Fund 507 of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, these findings are also present:

In the topic “Theses on the National Question,” specifically regarding “The National Question in Kosovo,” point 1) and sub-point b), the following findings are stated:

“b) Serbian colonization

Kosovo became the main region of colonization by Serbian elements.

This colonization was carried out through the seizure of land (meadows, pastures, forests) from the local Muslim population, especially Albanians.

Poor local peasants were given no land, while colonists from Serbia were settled (Chetniks, paramilitary commanders, Montenegrins, even from Vojvodina, Bar, and Istria).

Fertile Kosovo and Drenica fell into the hands of the colonists.

In the first phase of the colonization of Metohija, the regime simply confiscated the most fertile lands and distributed them, especially to Montenegrin officers.

c) Kosovo as a colony

Kosovo became a typical colonial province.

Like Macedonia, Kosovo was a region exploited by Serbian and foreign capital in various forms.

The local population consisted mainly of craftsmen, peasants, and small traders—thus without any accumulated domestic capital.”

“3) Conclusions

a) Kosovo represents a complex mosaic of national minorities and ethnic groups.

b) Serbian imperialism placed this province in a colonial position without solving any of its fundamental problems.

c) The national question of Kosovo is essentially the question of Albanians, Turks, Slavic Muslims, and some other minorities (Roma, Egyptians, Vlachs).

d) The project of a ‘Greater Albania’ offers no solution but merely replaces Serbian imperialism with Albanian or Italian imperialism.

e) The solution lies in the formation of a Free Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic of Kosovo through the revolutionary overthrow of the Serbian fascist-imperialist regime.

This would ensure land ownership for Albanians, Turks, and Muslims, liberation from national oppression, and the possibility of free political and cultural development.”

MILOVAN DJILAS ON KOSOVO DURING WORLD WAR II

Member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, leader of the war in Montenegro and Yugoslavia, close collaborator of Moša Pijade and Josip Broz Tito.

Question: What was your stance on Kosovo at that time?

Milovan Djilas: My personal stance, or—

Question: Your personal one.

Milovan Djilas: My stance was the same as that of the other members of the Central Committee, as well as that of the Central Committee of Albania: that we would unite with Albania, and through that unification, Kosovo would belong to Albania as a federal unit within Yugoslavia, or more broadly within a Balkan Federation.

Question: The Bujan Conference and the reaction of the CPY to it?

Milovan Djilas: When the Bujan Conference reached the Central Committee, no one knew what Dukagjin was, except me. As a Montenegrin, I knew this and drew the comrades’ attention to the fact that Dukagjin mentioned there included territory of both Yugoslavia and Albania. A position was then taken not to approve the Bujan Conference, and at Tito’s suggestion, I wrote and signed the text on behalf of the Central Committee, rejecting the Bujan Conference very softly so as not to create difficulties in mobilizing Albanians, but we rejected its decisions, maintaining the position that borders could not be changed, that this was a post-war question, and that the main issue at the time was the war against the occupier.

These also confirm the positions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1940) and of a member of the CPY Political Bureau, Milovan Djilas, that Kosovo was not a voluntary part of the state of the South Slavs: Yugoslavia.

WHY WAS SERBIA NOT DESIGNATED AS AN AGGRESSOR?

Serbia was not officially designated as an aggressor in the wars of former Yugoslavia for several pseudo-legal, political, and diplomatic reasons, even though it was the instigator and beneficiary of the wars. In many places in the region and in international opinion, Serbia was seen as the main force behind the wars.

Serbia and Montenegro avoided being labeled AGGRESSORS by considering themselves the successors of Yugoslavia.

• The government in Belgrade (under Slobodan Milošević) called itself the legitimate representative of Yugoslavia, labeling the independence of Croatia, Bosnia, and later Kosovo as secessionism.

• For this reason, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia were interpreted as internal conflicts of Yugoslavia, where ethnic groups were fighting for power and territory.

1. Serbia’s war strategy: Indirect support

To avoid being labeled an AGGRESSOR, Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milošević avoided officially declaring war on the new independent states (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo). Instead, they:

• Supported local Serbian groups in Croatia and Bosnia with weapons, funds, and covert paramilitary forces (e.g., the Army of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Serbian paramilitary forces in Kosovo).

• Presented the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as civil conflicts in which ethnic Serbs were “defending themselves” against the governments in Zagreb and Sarajevo.

2. International legal interpretation

• The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not officially declare Serbia an aggressor but punished it for aiding Serbian forces in Bosnia.

• The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 2007 that Serbia was not directly responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica but was guilty of failing to prevent it.

3. Diplomacy and international influence

• Russia and some other countries supported Serbia politically, blocking any official UN Security Council decision that would designate Serbia as an aggressor.

• The UN and the West initially treated the wars in former Yugoslavia as internal conflicts and sought to mediate negotiations rather than designate an aggressor.

4. Serbia as the successor of Yugoslavia

• Serbia and Montenegro considered themselves the successor state of Yugoslavia, not a new state attacking neighbors.

• Belgrade portrayed the war as an effort to keep Yugoslavia together, not as aggression against other countries.

5. The Kosovo war and NATO intervention

• In 1999, the West punished Serbia for repression against Kosovo Albanians through NATO bombings, yet still did not formally designate it as an “aggressor” in legal terms.

• Serbia treated the Kosovo war as an “internal issue,” claiming it was fighting KLA (UÇK) terrorism.

Conclusion

Serbia was not officially designated as an aggressor due to its strategy of indirect action, international support, and the absence of a clear legal decision by the UN and international courts. Nevertheless, in political and historical perception, it is seen as the main actor behind the wars in former Yugoslavia.

Kosovo is a victim of international decisions regarding the war in former Yugoslavia. The war was classified as a civil war, Serbia was not named as the aggressor due to Russian and Chinese influence in the Security Council, and the Dayton decisions for former Yugoslavia. Because of these decisions, we still suffer today. The war of the KLA (UÇK) is not recognized as a liberation war; Serbia is not recognized as an aggressor and occupier—everything is classified as conflict and civil war—equating Milošević’s servants with UÇK fighters.

Our tragic fate dates from 1912 and the creation of the Yugoslav state. We were not South Slavs, and our anti-colonial and liberation war dates from 1912, even from 1876 onward. Those who do not understand these facts are ignorant and waste Kosovo’s air, water, and food.

The Hague Court investigates and judges war crimes, but it does not recognize the Albanian liberation war—it calls it a conflict.

THE PROBLEM OF KOSOVO – KOSOVO WAS NOT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE STATE OF THE SOUTH SLAVS.

When the so-called Badinter Commission was formed in 1992 to manage the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, it failed to understand that Kosovo and Albanians in Yugoslavia were neither ethnically nor communally part of former Yugoslavia. They were never represented at their own ethnic-national level as part of a state known as a creation of the South Slavs—Yugoslavia before World War I and after World War II.

Even when the Hague Tribunal for war crimes was established in 1993 by the UN Security Council, under the influence of Russia and China, the war in former Yugoslavia was classified as a civil/internal war without an aggressor—benefiting Serbia the most. Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945, where the victim and aggressor were clear, in the case of former Yugoslavia a conciliatory court between conflicting parties was created—not one that held aggressors accountable, enforced responsibility, reparations, and victim compensation. The aggressor was not designated, nor were the bearers of aggression punished and reformed as in Nuremberg (denazification as a condition for Germany’s reconstruction). On these premises, the Hague Special Court was also created.

Kosovo is classified as part of former Yugoslavia and its citizens as loyal to Yugoslavia. Yet Kosovo and Albanians were not Yugoslavs, were never equal parts of Yugoslavia, and never felt loyal citizens of any Yugoslavia or Serbia. Even the only party was called the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—it was never called nor felt as the League of Communists of Albanians in Yugoslavia—because we were not recognized as part of the state, always awaiting our dissolution and assimilation into the new Yugoslav nation: first to make us Turks, then Muslims, or to assimilate us into the republic nations—“Serb” in Serbia, “Montenegrin” in Montenegro, and “Macedonian” in Macedonia.

Today, the Hague Court investigates and judges war crimes but does not recognize the Albanian liberation war. It does not recognize the aggressor and the instigator of the wars in former Yugoslavia. The Special Court is based on UN Security Council postulates which, with Russian and Chinese help, spared Serbia from being punished as an aggressor and treated the destruction of Yugoslavia as an internal conflict among South Slavic nations, on political bases of reconciliation.

Albanians in former Yugoslavia were not South Slavs, were never loyal or voluntary parts of the state called Yugoslavia, and therefore continuously waged a liberation war—not only during 1997–1999, but since as early as 1876–1877 onward.

Sources

https://istorija20veka.rs/…/uploads/2016/12/2016_1_10.pdf

Archive of Yugoslavia, fund of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, file 1940/14–12, together with the “Theses on the National Question” prepared by Moša Pijade for the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

Archive of Yugoslavia, Fund 507, Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Archive of Yugoslavia, Fund 790/1, Communist International

← Back

Thank you for your response. ✨

© All publications and posts on Balkanacademia.com are copyrighted. Author: Petrit Latifi. You may share and use the information on this blog as long as you credit “Balkan Academia” and “Petrit Latifi” and add a link to the blog.