By: Nehat Hyseni
The Republic of Kosovo is once again facing one of the most serious tests of its institutional functioning. What initially might have appeared to be an ordinary disagreement between political parties is increasingly taking the form of a recurring phenomenon: elections, inability to establish institutions, confrontations among political actors, differing interpretations of the Constitution, intervention by the Constitutional Court, new elections, and then a return to the same point.
This cycle is no longer merely the problem of one party, one leader, or one legislature. It has become a problem of the Republic’s institutional capacity to transform an electoral result into political stability.
The elections of June 7, 2026, held following the failure of the Assembly to elect the President of the Republic, did not fully resolve the crisis. The very fact that they represented the third attempt to establish a functioning legislature within approximately 18 months is a strong indication that the crisis itself has become institutionalized. LVV won approximately 43% of the vote and remained the largest political force, but the result did not provide it with a sufficient majority to govern alone.
Here lies the paradox of today’s Kosovo democracy: elections produce a winner, but politics fails to produce a functional system of governance.
This is the moment when we must stop and ask a deeper question: Is Kosovo simply facing a temporary political crisis, or is it gradually developing a new political culture in which conflict becomes more important than compromise, while partisan power begins to prevail over institutional interests?
To understand the present situation, we must look at the sequence of developments that has brought us here.
The institutional crisis did not begin on June 7, 2026. It had taken shape much earlier. Following the elections of February 9, 2025, the inability to establish a parliamentary majority led to a prolonged period of deadlock. In the autumn of 2025, attempts to form a government failed several times; new elections were subsequently held. Even the government formed in February 2026 failed to eliminate the structural problem.
In April 2026, the Assembly’s failure to elect the President led to another dissolution of the Assembly and early elections.
Thus, we are dealing with a chain of crises:
elections → insufficient result → failed negotiations → institutional deadlock → constitutional interpretation → intervention by the Constitutional Court → new elections → new result → risk of the same crisis.
When a political system repeatedly reproduces the same pattern, the problem can no longer be explained solely by the circumstances of a particular moment.
It must be analyzed as a defect in political culture and in the mechanisms of institutional cooperation.
THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION
A distinction must be made between political criticism and a legal determination. In March 2026, the Presidency stated that the Constitutional Court, in judgments KO72/26 and KO74/26, had confirmed the arguments of the Presidency and had not found any constitutional violation by President Osmani.
This is important for an academic analysis. In a state governed by the rule of law, an act cannot be declared “unconstitutional” merely on the basis of political conviction. The Constitutional Court is the authority that determines the legal meaning of constitutional provisions.
But here an even greater problem emerges.
If every political crisis ends up before the Constitutional Court, this indicates that political dialogue is increasingly being replaced by legal battles.
The Court can interpret the Constitution.
It cannot create the political compromise that political parties refuse to build.
This is one of the most important lessons of Kosovo’s crisis. The Constitution cannot substitute for political culture.
DEMOCRACY IS NOT THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE MAJORITY
One of the most serious dangers facing parliamentary democracy is the misunderstanding of the electoral mandate. The winner of an election has the right to govern if it secures the constitutional and parliamentary majority required to do so.
But winning an election is not authorization to eliminate the opposition, weaken independent institutions, or regard every criticism as an obstacle to the “will of the people.”
Modern democracy is not simply 50% 1 vote. It is a system in which the majority governs, but the minority has rights, institutions have defined powers, and the Constitution has supremacy over the temporary will of any political party.
Therefore, a distinction must be made between:
● an electoral majority;
● a parliamentary majority;
● executive power;
● the state; and
● the Constitution.
These are not synonyms.
A party may win an election.
It cannot win the state.
The state belongs to its citizens!
THE RISK OF THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER
In every young democracy there is a particular danger: when a political force succeeds in building a large electoral base and begins to interpret electoral success as a mandate for increasingly broad institutional control.
This does not mean that every strong majority automatically produces authoritarianism.
But political science recognizes a fundamental principle:
Democracy is measured not only by how power is won, but also by how power is constrained once it has been won.
Therefore, the following must be protected:
● the independence of the judiciary;
● the independence of constitutional institutions;
● media pluralism;
● parliamentary oversight;
● a functioning opposition;
● transparency;
● free elections;
● separation of powers;
● political rotation;
● respect for minorities; and
● public accountability.
When these mechanisms are weakened, democracy may continue to exist formally while its substance is gradually impoverished.
This is the danger of illiberal democracy: institutions continue to exist, but political power attempts to subordinate them to a dominant political will.
Therefore, the debate in Kosovo should not simply be:
“Who is winning?”
The more important question is:
“How strong are the institutions in resisting any political power that wins?”
In a democracy, citizens have the right to vote for a political program that others may consider mistaken. But there is another responsibility. The voter is not merely a consumer of politics. The voter is also a co-author of it.
Therefore, when a political party repeatedly demonstrates an unwillingness to compromise, challenges institutions, personalizes power, or interprets partisan interests as state interests, citizens should assess this behavior before casting their vote again.
The vote is not merely an expression of sympathy.
The vote is a political contract.
Therefore, the question every citizen should ask before an election is not:
“Which leader do I like?”
but:
“What kind of state will my vote help build?”
This is perhaps the most important message of this analysis. In a democracy, politicians cannot be blamed for everything. Voters also bear responsibility.
Not responsibility for decisions made by a party after the election, but responsibility for being informed, exercising judgment, and making a choice.
A democratic voter should ask:
1. Does this party respect the Constitution?
2. Does it respect independent institutions?
3. Does it accept parliamentary oversight?
4. Does it tolerate criticism?
5. Is it willing to compromise?
6. Does it accept defeat?
7. Does it respect the opposition?
8. Does it have a feasible economic program?
9. Does it defend the national interest or narrow partisan interests?
10. Does it strengthen or weaken Kosovo’s relationship with its democratic allies?
If these questions are not asked, democracy risks becoming an electoral ritual without a democratic culture.
ALLIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
Kosovo does not exist in a vacuum. It is a young state that needs alliances, investment, international recognition, European integration, and Euro-Atlantic support. Therefore, the institutional crisis is not merely an internal matter. The International Monetary Fund has assessed that political deadlock has delayed important reforms related to economic convergence with the European Union.
This should be understood as a serious warning.
A state does not merely lose time when its institutions fail to function.
It loses:
credibility; investment; economic opportunities; reforms; funding; diplomatic capital; and citizens’ confidence.
Therefore, domestic politics must understand one simple truth:
Institutional stability is part of national security.
If the current cycle continues, Kosovo risks entering a new form of “political normality” in which elections become an instrument for resolving disputes that politics itself is unable to resolve.
This is extremely dangerous.
Elections are a mechanism for determining the will of citizens, not a mechanism for avoiding political responsibility.
If every conflict ends with new elections, the system may enter an endless electoral cycle in which political parties become increasingly focused on campaigning and increasingly less focused on governing.
A democracy cannot function merely by voting.
It must also govern, pass laws, approve budgets, implement reforms, negotiate with allies, protect the public interest—and, above all:
it must function.
A MESSAGE TO POLICYMAKERS
Kosovo does not need another political war for power. It needs a minimum democratic pact.
This pact should contain at least five principles:
1. The Constitution above the party
No political party can place itself above the Constitution.
2. The institution above the leader
The Republic cannot be built around the personality of a single politician.
3. Compromise above deadlock
Compromise is not betrayal. In a democracy, compromise is an instrument of governance.
4. Opposition above hostility
The opposition is not an enemy of the state. It is part of the democratic state.
5. The state interest above the electoral interest
Not every partisan victory is a national victory. Sometimes a political party can win an election while the state loses.
This must be understood before it is too late.
The citizens of Kosovo must move beyond the logic of emotional voting.
It is not enough for a leader to promise change. One must examine how that leader exercises power after winning it.
It is not enough to speak of patriotism. One must see whether institutions are being strengthened.
It is not enough to speak of sovereignty. One must see whether the state is becoming more functional.
It is not enough to speak of the people.
One must see whether citizens who think differently are respected.
And above all:
Do not equate the party with the state!
Parties come and go.
Leaders come and go.
Governments come and go.
But the Republic must remain.
CONCLUSION
Kosovo has gone through challenges far more severe than today’s institutional crises. But precisely for that reason, it must be particularly careful.
A state born from the extraordinary sacrifice of its citizens cannot allow its political energy to be consumed by an endless marathon of institutional confrontations.
Today, Kosovo does not need an absolute leader.
Nor does it need a destructive opposition.
It does not need institutions turned into arenas of partisan warfare.
It needs strong institutions, leaders constrained by the Constitution, a constructive opposition, and critical citizens.
That is democracy!
Because democracy is not the rule of whoever wins.
It is the system that guarantees that even the winner cannot rule without limits.
Therefore, the message to policymakers is clear:
Do not use the Republic as a means to gain power. Use power to strengthen the Republic!
And the message to citizens is even more important:
Do not measure a political party only by what it promises before elections. Measure it by the way it behaves toward the Constitution, institutions, the opposition, allies, and citizens after it takes power.
Because the vote is free.
But its consequences are public.
And when a society repeatedly votes for the same political model, it can no longer claim that the model is solely the responsibility of politicians.
Democracy begins with the vote, but it does not end at the ballot box.
It continues every day—in the Assembly, in the Government, in the Presidency, in the courts, in the media, in civil society, and in the conscience of every citizen.
Therefore, Kosovo must end the marathon of crisis and begin the marathon of state-building.
Because the Republic does not need absolute power.
The Republic needs institutions that respect the Constitution.
And that is the boundary that no political majority, no matter how large, should ever cross.
Preševo, August 7, 2026
