Written by: Nehat Hyseni

The recent decision of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) to abandon the co-government with the Self-Determination Movement (LVV) and to remain in opposition must be seen beyond the usual party calculations. It comes at a time when the Republic of Kosovo is facing a serious institutional crisis, in which citizens expect from political entities not only ambitions for power, but above all state responsibilities.

In this circumstance, the transition of LDK to the opposition can be interpreted in two ways. If it is seen only as a rejection of co-government, it can be perceived as a step that deepens the crisis. But if it is accompanied by a clear commitment to the functioning of institutions, respect for the Constitution, inter-party dialogue and the election of a consensual president, then the decision can become an unblocking factor.

This is precisely where the weight of LDK’s responsibility lies.

The LDK has made it known that it does not accept being a decorative part of a government where it would not have real weight in decision-making. This is a politically understandable position. In a parliamentary democracy, a coalition cannot only mean the division of ministries or positions, but must mean co-responsibility, co-decision-making, mutual respect and clear agreements on the direction of the state.

Therefore, the rejection of an unequal co-government is not necessarily a rejection of responsibility. On the contrary, it could be the beginning of a new political responsibility, if the LDK proves that it can be a constructive opposition and at the same time an active factor in resolving the crisis.

The unblocking role of the LDK

In the current situation, the LDK could have a much more important role than simply moving to the opposition benches. It could become a political bridge between the parties and a mediating factor for the restoration of institutional dialogue.

This is especially important if the LDK keeps its promise that, even from the opposition, it will contribute to the election of a consensual president.

This promise should not be seen as a secondary detail of political agreements. In the circumstances of a deep institutional crisis, the election of a president who enjoys broad political and social support can serve as a meeting point between political forces. The consensual president should not be the product of a narrow party bargain, but the result of a broad understanding of the interest of the Republic.

If the LDK is seriously committed to this goal, then its transition to opposition would not be simply a withdrawal from power. It could be a concrete contribution to unblocking the institutional system.

This is what citizens should expect from a party with a long institutional tradition: not necessarily participation in every government, but participation in every serious effort to protect the functioning of the Republic.

A consensual president, elected through dialogue and political understanding, can create a new political climate. It can help overcome mistrust between entities and create space for broader agreement on the functioning of institutions.

At this point, the LDK can prove that opposition does not mean political isolation. The opposition can also be a stabilizing force for the state.

The opposition is not a blockade

But this is where the greatest responsibility really begins!

In an institutional crisis, the opposition is not simply an opponent of the government. It is part of the democratic mechanism of the state. Therefore, the LDK proves that the decision to remain in opposition is not a rejection of state responsibility, but a choice for a modern, constructive and institutional opposition.

A democratic opposition should criticize the government when it makes mistakes, control it when it exceeds its powers, oppose it when it violates the public interest, but at the same time it should be ready to cooperate when it comes to the fundamental interests of the state.

This is particularly important on issues that require a broad political majority. The election of the president, the functioning of institutions, the protection of the constitutional order, and the preservation of the Euro-Atlantic orientation cannot be treated as the property of one party.

If the LDK understands this role and implements it in practice, it can transform the opposition into a position of extraordinary institutional weight.

Even the majority has responsibilities

But the responsibility does not lie solely with the LDK.

If the LVV, as the first political force, seeks to govern, it must understand that electoral victory is not a license for political domination or for a dictatorship of the majority. Democracy does not end the day the votes are counted. On the contrary, that is when the responsibility to use the mandate in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of parliamentary democracy begins.

A parliamentary majority has the right to govern, but it does not have the right to consider the opposition an obstacle to be eliminated. It must see the opposition as a necessary part of the democratic system.

Therefore, the LVV must also take a step towards a culture of compromise. No party, no matter how great its electoral result, can build the stability of the Republic on permanent conflict with the rest of the political spectrum.

In a democratic state, the majority rules, but the Constitution limits power; the opposition opposes, but state interest limits its destructiveness.

This is the formula that Kosovo must learn and implement.

Consensual presidency as an opportunity to overcome the crisis

In this context, the LDK’s promise to contribute to the election of a consensual president takes on particular importance.

Kosovo needs an institutional figure who will not be perceived as the president of a party, a leader or a political camp. The president must be a factor of unity, stability and representation of the Republic.

For this reason, a serious consultation process between political parties would be much more useful than public clashes, accusations, and endless conditioning.

The LDK is ready to make its contribution to this goal, therefore it can become part of a new political formula: opposition in government, but cooperative on issues of state interest.

This is not a contradiction. On the contrary, it is one of the real signs of democratic maturity!

The LDK does not have to enter the government to prove its patriotism and responsibility. It can also prove this by helping to solve the problems that threaten the functioning of institutions. The decision to remain in opposition could be a step towards a new political balance.

From the struggle for power to responsibility for the state

The party that has historically played an important role in building political pluralism and Kosovo’s statehood must show that it can be an opposition without being destructive and patriotic without falling into populism.

The interest of the Republic must be above the interest of any party and the career of any leader!

Kosovo needs a new political culture: less personal protagonism, less clashes, more dialogue; fewer party interests, more institutions; less struggle for power, more responsibility towards the state.

This requires a major change in political mentality.

Parties should not see the Republic as a space where each tries to expand its influence. The Republic is above parties. The political mandate is temporary; institutions are permanent. Leaders change, governments change, parliamentary majorities change, but the state must continue to function.

Therefore, every political action must be measured by a simple question: Does this action strengthen or weaken the Republic of Kosovo?

LDK faces a historic test!

The decision to remain in opposition could be an important turning point for the LDK. But its importance will not be determined by political statements, but by concrete behavior in the Assembly and in the institutions of the Republic.

If the LDK builds a strong parliamentary, professional, and democratic opposition, it can transform the opposition stance into a real governing alternative.

If it supports solutions that require consensus, especially the election of a consensual president, contributes to the functioning of institutions, and opposes any attempt to block the state, then it will have proven that the opposition can be a major state-building force.

But if the opposition becomes an instrument of institutional blockage, then political responsibility will also fall on it.

Therefore, the LDK must make a clear distinction between opposition to the government and opposition to the state. The first is democracy. The second is destructiveness.

Republic over party!

In the end, Kosovo does not need another cycle of political revenge. It does not need an endless war between parties, leaders and political groups.

It needs a minimum national and institutional agreement: the Constitution over the party; the Republic over the leader; democracy over power!

Therefore, the LDK’s decision to remain in opposition could deepen the crisis or bring a solution closer. It all depends on how this position will be used.

If the LDK remains in opposition to hinder any institutional functioning, then the crisis will deepen.

But if it remains in opposition to control power, to defend the Constitution, to build its own political alternative and, above all, to contribute to unblocking institutions and electing a consensual president, then this decision could become an important contribution to Kosovo’s exit from the crisis.

This is the real proof.

The Republic cannot be held hostage by any party!

At this historic moment, the task of all political forces is not just to ask: “Who will win power?”

The first question should be:

“How do we save the functionality of the state from the crisis?”

The answer should be clear: Kosovo needs functional institutions, a government that respects constitutional boundaries, a responsible opposition, and a political culture based on dialogue and compromise.

And in this effort, the LDK has a unique opportunity: to prove that it can be in opposition to the government, without being in opposition to the Republic; to oppose the government without blocking the state; and, through its commitment to a consensual president, to make a concrete contribution to unblocking the institutional crisis.

Presevo, August 15, 2026