Written by: Nehat Hyseni

When the promise of “salvation” turns into in crisis

Modern political history has proven that populism is not just a common way of electoral communication. Under certain circumstances, it can transform into a new political culture, a way of governance and, in the most severe cases, a threat to democratic institutions, political pluralism and social coexistence.

Populism, of course, is not the same in every country and cannot be automatically equated with fascism, dictatorship or authoritarianism. There are different forms of populism, on the left and on the right, in consolidated democracies and in societies in transition. However, a common characteristic of many populist movements is the construction of a sharp division between the “real people” and the “corrupt elites”, claiming that only one political force, one leader or one movement authentically represents the will of the people.

This is precisely the point where populism can become dangerous: when democracy begins to be interpreted not as a system of institutions, checks, balances, and compromises, but as the unlimited power of the majority represented by a leader.

In this sense, the lessons of history are important. Nazi Germany, Benito Mussolini’s fascist Italy, and Slobodan Milosevic’s nationalist regime in the former Yugoslavia show that the mobilization of social discontent, fear, historical victimization, and aggressive nationalism can produce catastrophic consequences. But these cases should not be used to draw mechanical parallels with every contemporary populist movement. Their lesson is deeper: democracy begins to be endangered when a society becomes convinced that only one leader, one party, or one ideology can save it.

Kosovo should not embark on this path. It needs the opposite: strong institutions, real pluralism, political dialogue, checks and balances of power, respect for the Constitution and the law, and a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Populism and the psychology of the “savior”

Populism flourishes especially in societies that have gone through wars, difficult transitions, poverty, corruption, inequality, and disillusionment with political elites.

In these circumstances, the citizen does not always seek a complicated institutional program. He often seeks a simple answer to complex problems.

The populist offers this answer.

He says: “The problem is them!” “We are the people.”

“They are the elite.” “We are clean.” “They are thieves.” “We will clean up the state.” “We will restore its dignity.” “We will make the nation strong!”

This language is extremely powerful psychologically, because it reduces the complexity of reality to a single conflict: the people against the enemies of the people.

At this point, the political opponent is no longer seen as a citizen with a different opinion. He becomes an obstacle, a traitor, a sellout, a corrupt person, or an enemy. And when the opponent becomes an enemy, compromise begins to be considered treason. This is one of the greatest dangers of populist culture today in the Republic of Kosovo!

Democracy, on the contrary, is based on exactly the opposite: the acceptance that even the opponent has the right to exist, to speak, to win elections, to lose elections, and still be a legitimate part of the Republic.

Great promise and harsh reality

One of the characteristics of populism is the production of extraordinary expectations. The people are promised a rapid, almost magical change! They are promised a wealthy state, a just society, a developed economy, the elimination of corruption, a stronger international position and a happier future.

The problem is that the state does not function with slogans: the economy is not developed with speeches, justice is not built with labels, diplomacy is not done with emotional statements, and democracy is not strengthened by weakening institutions.

The modern state requires professional administration, independent institutions, investment, education, healthcare, a competitive economy, functional justice, and a wise foreign policy.

These are not built overnight!

Therefore, when populist promises are not fulfilled, there is a risk that responsibility is shifted to the “enemies”: the opposition, the media, the courts, internationals, other states, minorities, intellectuals, or the citizens themselves.

This creates a vicious circle: big promise → big expectation → failure → blaming others → polarization → conflict → institutional weakening.

This cycle must be broken before it becomes a political culture.

The bitter lessons of the 20th century

European history is full of examples of where the combination of extreme populism, aggressive nationalism, propaganda, and the concentration of power can lead.

In Germany, the economic and social crises of the Weimar Republic period created a breeding ground for extremism. Adolf Hitler and Nazism built a political narrative that portrayed Germany as a victim and promised a return to national greatness.

The result was catastrophic: dictatorship, world war, the Holocaust, and tens of millions of victims.

Fascist Italy followed a different path, but with similar mechanisms: leader cult, nationalism, weakening of pluralism, propaganda and glorification of the state.

In the former Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic’s regime powerfully used nationalism, historical victimization, and collective fear for political mobilization. The result was the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, with serious crimes and massive loss of human life.

These cases are not copies of each other. But they teach us a universal principle: when politics is built on fear, hatred, victimization, and the belief that only one political force represents the nation, democracy becomes vulnerable.

Therefore, history should not be used to scare the people, but to educate them!

Kosovo and the social terrain of populism

Kosovo has a unique history. It has experienced repression, war, ethnic cleansing, international intervention, independence, and a difficult institutional transition.

After 1999, Kosovar society had extremely high expectations. For many citizens, the war was a symbol of national sacrifice and liberation. For others, staying out of the war or not being able to participate directly in it created a different psychological feeling, which in some cases may have transformed into a need to find another way to contribute to the country’s political history.

We need to be very careful here. It is not scientifically correct to say that just because a large part of the population did not directly participate in the war, it will vote for a certain party. Electoral behavior has many causes: social, economic, generational, regional, psychological and political.

However, the complex relationship of generations to war can be a serious sociological and socio-psychological topic for study.

In Kosovar society, especially after 1999, a strong debate has arisen about “merit”, “sacrifice” and “political legitimacy”.

Part of the populist discourse has summed this up in an extremely simple formula:

“They stole Kosovo, and we will save it!”

This formula had mobilizing power, because it touched on the real disappointment of citizens with corruption, clientelism, unemployment, and the weaknesses of the state.

The mistake would be to deny the existence of these problems.

But an even bigger mistake would be to believe that only one party has the final answers!

From legitimate criticism to demonization of the opponent

Kosovo has had strong reasons to demand change. Corruption, nepotism, abuse of public office, weaknesses in the judiciary, and political irresponsibility must be criticized.

But criticism of previous governments should not turn into the delegitimization of an entire political generation.

It cannot be said that all those who have governed under a certain force are “thieves”.

It cannot be said that all those who have fought are infallible.

Nor can it be said that all those who have not fought are less patriotic.

And it cannot be said that all those who vote for a party are manipulated people.

A democratic society is not built on collective labels.

It is built by distinguishing the individual from the group, responsibility from accusation, criticism from slander, and patriotism from propaganda.

Diaspora and the power of its narrative

The Albanian diaspora has played and continues to play an extraordinary role in Kosovo. It has contributed financially, politically, and nationally in various periods.

In recent elections, the diaspora has also shown significant electoral influence. This is a normal part of democracy. But the diaspora, like citizens within Kosovo, should have the opportunity to be informed in a pluralistic manner.

When political information is reduced to social media, short videos, slogans and emotional communication, there is a risk that the complex reality of Kosovo will be replaced by a virtual reality. It must be governed by the Constitution, the law, institutions and public accountability.

When “the people” become an argument against institutions

One of the most serious problems with populism is the use of the concept of “the people” as an absolute source of legitimacy.

But who are the people? The people consist of all citizens. Even those who vote for the government. Even those who vote for the opposition. Even those who do not vote. Even those who criticize the president. Even those who criticize the prime minister. Even journalists. Even judges. Even academics. Even minorities.

Therefore, a leader cannot say: “I am the people!” He can only say: “I am a representative of a portion of the citizens who have given me a mandate.”

This distinction is fundamental! Because the moment a leader identifies with the people, any criticism of him can be presented as criticism of the people.

This is how the delegitimization of the opposition begins. Then the media is delegitimized. Then the courts. Then the independent institutions.

And in the end, the Constitution can be treated as an obstacle to the “will of the people.” This is the path that a democracy should not allow!

Today’s crisis in Kosovo is also a crisis of political culture. The institutional blockade that Kosovo is experiencing must be seen beyond the current conflict. The problem is not just one post. It is not just the Presidential post. It is not just one party.

The problem is the much bigger question: Will Kosovo be a Republic of institutions or a Republic of leaders?

If institutions only function when one party has an absolute majority, then we have a weak democracy.

True democracy is tested when no one has absolute control. That is where the need for compromise arises. The parliament must function. The opposition must exist. The president must have a constitutional role. The courts must be independent. The media must be free.

Civil society should have space and the government should be controllable. This is called separation and balance of power.

The need for a President with constitutional authority

Kosovo needs a serious debate on the role of the President in its political system. This debate should not be a debate about the person. It should not be a debate about the name. It should be a debate about the institution.

A President who respects the Constitution, who is not an instrument of a party, who has moral and political authority, and who can serve as a balancing factor, can have a very important role in a system where party polarization is high.

The president should not be an “opponent” of a prime minister just because he belongs to a different political camp. He should be a guarantor of constitutional order within his powers. This is much more important.

Kosovo does not need a president-prime minister war. It needs a president-government-assembly-judiciary balance, built on the Constitution. Only such a system can prevent excessive concentration of power.

The Euro-Atlantic orientation should not be questioned.

Another important dimension of this crisis is the strategic orientation of the Republic of Kosovo. Kosovo is a European state and aspires to integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. This requires more than declarations.

It requires functional democracy, the rule of law, predictable relations with partners, credible institutions, and a coordinated foreign policy. Euro-Atlantic orientation should not be the property of one party. No party should have a monopoly on patriotism.

Europe and NATO are not party slogans, they are a strategic state interest!

Therefore, Kosovo’s foreign policy should be as much a matter of national consensus and as little an instrument of internal party warfare as possible. A small state, in Kosovo’s geopolitical position, cannot afford the luxury of diplomatic isolation, unnecessary conflict with partners, and strategic uncertainty. Kosovo needs friends, allies, and partners.

From a culture of division to a culture of cooperation

Kosovo needs a major cultural change in politics, and not just a change of government, not just a change of leaders, but a real change in the way politics is done.

We must move: from “us against them” to “us and them in the Republic”; from political revenge to institutional responsibility; from propaganda to argument; from label to program; from leader to institution; from party to state; from conflict to compromise; from populism to constitutional democracy.

Compromise is not betrayal! Compromise is one of the main mechanisms of democracy.

In a pluralistic democracy, no one person gets everything, and that is precisely why democracy works.

What should Kosovo politics do?

First, the institutional blockade must be ended immediately and conditions must be created for the normal functioning of the Assembly and the institutions of the Republic.

Secondly, all parties must accept that the electoral mandate is not a mandate to block the state.

Third, a new culture of inter-party dialogue must be created.

Fourth, the independence of institutions must be strengthened.

Fifth, the use of state organs as weapons against political opponents should be avoided.

Sixth, a broad political agreement on the Euro-Atlantic orientation must be created.

Seventh, the constitutional role of the President as a factor of institutional stability and balance must be strengthened.

Eighth, much more should be invested in civic education and democratic culture.

Because democracy is not protected by the Constitution alone. Democracy is protected by citizens who understand why the Constitution is greater than any party and why the Republic is more important than any leader.

The citizen of Kosovo must have the courage to ask: Were the promises fulfilled? Is the economy better? Are the institutions stronger? Is the judiciary more independent? Are relations with allies better? Is society less polarized? Is the Assembly more functional? Is the state more democratic?

These are the real questions.

No: “Did my leader attack the opponent?”

No: “Did my party win?”

No: “Did the opponent lose?”

Because democracy is not a football match.

In football, one side wins and the other loses.

In a country, when democracy is lost, everyone loses!

Conclusion

Kosovo does not need another political myth of a “savior”, it needs institutions. It does not need a leader who claims to “know it all”, but it needs institutions that check each other.

There is no need for a party that claims to be the people, but there is a need for a Republic where every citizen is part of the people.

There is no need for permanent political war, but there is a need for a culture of compromise.

There is no need for isolation, but there is a need for a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation.

There is no need to weaken the Constitution, but there is a need to respect it.

And above all, Kosovo needs a new political culture where no one dares to violate the Constitution and place themselves above the Republic!

Because history teaches us that societies are not only destroyed by wars. They can also be weakened and destroyed by political hatred, polarization, propaganda, mistrust, and the gradual destruction of institutions.

Therefore, today the task of every democratic political force in Kosovo is not to ask: “How do we defeat the opponent?” The question should be: “How do we save the democratic culture of the Republic?”

Kosovo needs a new political and civic agreement. This is not a call against anyone, but a call for the Republic, and if Kosovo wants to get out of this crisis, the way is not through a new populism replacing an old populism.

The path is much more difficult, but also much safer: to build a democracy where no one is above the Constitution, no party is above the state, and no leader is above the Republic!

Presevo, August 13, 2026