Written by: Nehat Hyseni

The Republic of Kosovo is once again facing one of the most serious tests of the functioning of its constitutional and institutional order. We are no longer dealing with just a disagreement between political parties, a conflict over the election of the Speaker of the Assembly, or an internal parliamentary procedural problem.

On August 7, 2026, the 30-day deadline for the constitution of the Assembly resulting from the June 7 elections expired. This deadline had begun after the official certification of the election results and was directly related to the constitutional requirement that the constitutive session be held within thirty days.

The fact that the deadline has passed without the constitution of the Assembly being completed puts the Republic into a new phase of institutional crisis.

Here we must be legally precise: it is not the duty of a political analyst to definitively declare which subject or individual has committed a constitutional violation. This belongs to the Constitutional Court. But it is completely legal and necessary to say that the constitutional deadline has expired and that the failure to fulfill the constitutional obligation has created an exceptional institutional situation that requires constitutional interpretation and solution. This is much more than a debate, it is a matter of the state, the Republic! At the foundation of every democratic Republic lies a simple principle: the Constitution is the highest law of the state.

It is not a party program. It is not a political statement. It is not an agreement that is implemented only when the parties agree.

And it is not a symbolic text that can be bypassed when political interests come into conflict. Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo stipulates that the Assembly is elected for a four-year term, which begins on the day of the constitutive session and that this session must be held within 30 days of the official announcement of the election results. This wording is of extraordinary importance. It shows that the framers of the constitution did not intend for the constitution of the Assembly to remain without a time limit.

Because parliamentary democracy cannot function if after the elections there is only the election result, but no institution. The 30-day deadline should not be understood as a technical, administrative or decorative deadline. It is a mechanism against institutional blockade.

After the elections of June 7, 2026, the results were certified on July 8. From this date, the 30-day constitutional deadline for the constitution of the new Assembly began to run. According to reports published before the deadline expired, August 7 was the last day for the completion of this process. But the process was not concluded.

The constitutive session continued to remain blocked and, according to reports on August 7, the deadline expired at midnight without a full constitution being achieved. Thus, Kosovo enters dangerous institutional territory. The question is no longer:

“Will the Assembly be constituted within the deadline?”

This question is now a thing of the past. The question now is: “What happens after the constitutional deadline has expired?” And this question cannot be resolved by press conferences, party statements, or political interpretations alone. It requires a legal answer.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLITICAL CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

Kosovo has had political crises before. Political crises are normal in a democracy. Parties disagree. Coalitions fail.

Negotiations can break down. The opposition can challenge the majority. A candidate may not get the necessary votes. These are part of democratic life. But there is a red line:

When political conflict impedes the implementation of a constitutional obligation, the political crisis begins to take on a constitutional character.

This is precisely why the situation of August 8, 2026, cannot be treated as another ordinary episode of inter-party conflict.

The problem has become systemic. If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the institutions must have mechanisms to overcome the deadlock. If the mechanisms do not work, the Constitution must act.

If the Constitution is also interpreted in a contradictory way, the Constitutional Court must act. But none of this should be used as a substitute for political will for compromise. The Court can interpret the Constitution. It cannot produce solutions.

The party can win the elections. But it cannot win the Republic!

One of the most dangerous misconceptions of modern democracy is the idea that electoral victory gives the winner the right to do anything.

That’s not the case. In a democracy, winning an election is the legitimacy to govern within the Constitution. Not outside it!

A party may receive the largest number of votes. It may be the largest parliamentary entity. It may claim the first right to form a government. But it must negotiate with other actors when it does not have the majority necessary to elect the President.

This is not weakness. It is democracy. Compromise is not weakness. On the contrary, in parliamentary systems, compromise is the mechanism through which the vote of the citizens is transformed into governance.

Therefore, if a political force wins elections but does not have the numbers necessary for it, it must understand a fundamental truth:

The people may give a party political supremacy, but the Constitution defines the limits of power!

The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo is not the property of LVV, PDK, LDK, AAK.

It is not owned by any other party.

The Parliament is an institution of the Republic!

Deputies receive a mandate from the citizens, but once they receive the mandate, their duty is to act within the constitutional order. MK This distinction must be made very clearly: The Party is a political organization, the Assembly is a state institution. The leader is a political individual. The Republic is a permanent institution. The Government is temporary. The Constitution is the legal foundation of the state – the Republic.

If these categories are mixed, then the personalization of the state is created. And the personalization of the state is one of the most serious dangers for new democracies.

Even if the Constitutional Court will further determine the legal consequences of the expiration of the term, there is a responsibility that cannot disappear behind legal formulas. It is political responsibility. When citizens elect 120 deputies, they do not elect them to see them through an endless marathon of procedures. They elect them to: approve laws; control the government; approve the budget; protect the public interest; represent citizens; guarantee the democratic functioning of the state.

When the Assembly fails to be constituted, the citizen loses something much greater than a parliamentary session: they lose effective representation, they lose time, they lose trust. And the Republic loses credibility.

This is why the institutional blockade should also be seen as an issue of representative democracy.

A modern state cannot function only with a functioning government, administration, and executive institutions.

The Assembly is one of the main pillars of the constitutional system. It is the place where the electoral will is translated into law. When it does not function, a democratic vacuum is created, and its functionality is weakened. And institutional weakening has concrete consequences: economic, legal, social, diplomatic and security.

Investors seek stability. International partners seek predictability.

The citizen requires institutions. The administration requires a legal and budgetary basis. Allies require a state that can make decisions. In international politics, institutional stability is part of a state’s strength.

Therefore, the Assembly crisis is not just an issue of politicians in Pristina. It is an issue of Kosovo’s position in the region.

One of the greatest dangers of recurring crises is their normalization.

First, citizens are worried. Then they protest, they get angry, and finally they get tired.

This is exactly what needs to be prevented!

A democracy should not get used to the dysfunction of institutions. Because when dysfunction is repeated, it begins to be perceived as normality. And a state that accepts the blockade as normality begins to lose the culture of institutional responsibility.

Kosovo has gone through many difficult periods. It has gone through war, repression, international administration. It has declared independence, built institutions, gained international recognition. It has created the army and security institutions, and built a democratic system.

All of these are great achievements. But state-building does not end with the declaration of independence. State-building is an ongoing process.

And today one of Kosovo’s main tasks is to prove that the Republic is stronger than any party.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: GUARANTOR OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT AN ARBITRATOR OF POLITICS!

In this crisis, the Constitutional Court will have an extraordinary role. But even here, a balance must be maintained. The Court must not become an arena where parties transfer their political conflicts.

Politicians should solve as many problems as possible through political dialogue.

The court must intervene when the Constitution has been violated.

This is the fair division of roles. The court should not govern. The government should not judge.

Parliament should not arbitrarily interpret the Constitution.

No one should exceed constitutional powers. And parties should not place themselves above institutions.

This is the essence of the rule of law!

WHAT SHOULD KOSOVO POLITICS DO?

Kosovo today does not need another clash. It needs an agreement. Not necessarily a grand political coalition, but a minimal pact for the functioning of the Republic.

This pact should contain several basic principles:

1. The Constitution on party interest

No party should interpret the Constitution according to the needs of the moment.

2. Republic over leader

No leader is more important than the institution.

3. Compromise on the blockade. Compromise is an instrument of democracy, not political weakness!

4. Institutions on emotions

State decisions should not be made out of political anger.

5. Responsibility for propaganda

Citizens must be told the truth, even when it is unpleasant.

The opposition is part of the democratic system.

The majority rules, but the Constitution limits the power of the majority!

In this difficult moment, all institutional actors must show prudence: The winning party must show that it knows how to govern not only when it wins the elections. The opposition must prove that political opposition does not mean blocking the state. MPs must understand that their mandate is not personal property.

The Constitutional Court must maintain its legal authority, independence, and standard of constitutional interpretation.

Everyone has a common responsibility:

to save institutional functionality from the logic of party conflict. In this situation, politics should not be blamed alone. The role of the citizen must also be considered.

A democratic citizen should not be a party fan. He should be a citizen of the Republic.

It shouldn’t just ask: “Who won?”

I must ask: “What did the Republic gain?”

It should not just ask: “Which leader is stronger?” It should ask: “How strong are the institutions?” It should not just ask: “Which party is patriotic?” It should ask: “Which policy really strengthens the state?”

Patriotism is not measured by words alone!

Institutional patriotism is measured by respect for the Constitution, the law, institutions, citizens, and the long-term interest of the Republic.

Kosovo needs a new patriotism:

Not patriotism that is measured by the noise of declarations.

Not patriotism used to silence criticism.

Not patriotism that equates a party with the nation!

But a civic and institutional patriotism.

Loving Kosovo means respecting the Republic!

Respecting the Republic means respecting the Constitution. Respecting the Constitution means accepting the limitation of power. Accepting the limitation of power means accepting democracy, and accepting democracy means accepting that no one is above the state.

This is a more mature form of patriotism!

Beyond today’s crisis, Kosovo must think about a deeper reform of its political culture.!

Perhaps the time has come for political parties, institutions, and civil society to seriously discuss a Republic Pact.

This pact would not be an agreement for power!

Such a reform would be far more important than another temporary agreement between leaders.

Because Kosovo doesn’t just need to solve today’s crisis. It needs to prevent tomorrow’s crisis.

The current crisis can be used to learn lessons. It could become the moment when Kosovo decides that:

No majority is above the Constitution!

No opposition is above the interest of the state!

No leader is above the institution!

No party is the Republic!

No electoral mandate is a mandate for unlimited power!

If these principles become part of the political culture, today’s crisis could become a turning point.

If not, then there is a risk that Kosovo will continue to repeat the same cycle:

elections → blockade → crisis → constitutional interpretation → new elections → new blockade.

This would be a failure not only of politicians. It would be a failure of democratic culture and more.

CONCLUSION

Kosovo today is at an important moment in its institutional history.

The 30-day deadline for the constitution of the Assembly has expired. This is a constitutional and political fact that cannot be relativized with party rhetoric.

But what happens next must be determined in a measured, legal and institutional manner. This is not the time for political revenge, nor for language that divides society.

This is not the time to use the Republic as a weapon against the adversary. This is the time to defend the Republic!

Kosovo needs leaders who know how to govern without blocking the state. The Republic needs leaders who know how to win without making victory absolute.

There is a need for an opposition that opposes without damaging institutional functioning. There is a need for citizens who vote with their minds and not just with emotion.

And above all, there is a need for a political culture in which the Constitution is not interpreted according to the interests of the day, but is respected as the fundamental contract of the Republic.

Kosovo must not allow the crisis of institutions to become a crisis of the state.

The Republic is not the property of the leader and the winning party of the elections, nor of the opposition and the majority. The Republic is the constitutional home of all its citizens.

Therefore, at this historic moment, the message must be clear:

Don’t destroy the Republic by fighting for power!

Don’t put the party above the Constitution!

The Republic should be above the leader, and Democracy above power!

Kosovo does not need another marathon of crises. Kosovo needs a new marathon of state-building. And this marathon must begin with respecting the Constitution!

Presevo, August 8, 2026