Image from Srpske Novine

Introduction

Serbia has increasingly deepened its military relationship with Israel at a time when Israel’s conduct in Gaza is the subject of some of the most serious allegations of violations of international humanitarian law in the modern era.

The issue is not simply whether Serbia itself is conducting military operations in Gaza. It is whether a state can continue supplying military equipment, ammunition, technology and industrial capacity to another state while there is a substantial and well-documented risk that such capabilities may be used in the commission of serious violations of international law.

Serbia’s relationship with Israel therefore deserves scrutiny not only as a matter of foreign policy, but also as a question of international responsibility, ethics and political accountability.

The International Court of Justice has specifically addressed the obligations of states concerning military assistance and arms transfers. In its 2024 proceedings concerning the Genocide Convention, the Court stated that states have obligations to proactively ascertain whether weapons transferred to another state might be used to commit breaches of international humanitarian law or the Genocide Convention.¹

Against this background, Serbia’s expanding defence relationship with Israel raises serious questions.

1. Serbia Has Expanded Its Arms Relationship with Israel

Serbia is not merely maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. It has become an increasingly important defence partner.

Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, Serbian arms exports to Israel increased dramatically. Investigations by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and Haaretz reported a substantial increase in Serbian ammunition exports to Israel after October 2023. Subsequent reporting indicated that Serbian arms exports to Israel had increased many times over compared with previous levels.

This relationship has included ammunition and other military products.

The importance of this should not be underestimated.

Ammunition is not an abstract diplomatic commodity. It is a direct component of military operations. When a state supplies ammunition to a country engaged in an active armed conflict, the supplier is contributing material resources to that country’s ability to conduct military operations.

That does not automatically make the supplier legally responsible for every subsequent use of the ammunition.

However, the legal question becomes considerably more serious when there is a foreseeable risk that transferred weapons will be used in violations of international humanitarian law.

This is precisely why the ICJ’s reasoning concerning arms transfers is so important.

2. Serbia and Israel Are Now Planning Joint Combat-Drone Production

The relationship has gone beyond conventional arms exports.

In April 2026, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that Serbia and Israel would jointly manufacture combat drones. Reuters reported that the proposed cooperation would be a 50–50 partnership intended both to strengthen Serbia’s defence capabilities and increase arms exports.²

The announcement is significant because it transforms Serbia from merely an external supplier into a potential participant in the production ecosystem of Israeli military technology.

Reuters also reported that Serbia had previously purchased approximately $335 million worth of Israeli military equipment, including Elbit Systems’ PULS artillery systems and Hermes drones. In 2025, Serbia subsequently announced a much larger acquisition of missiles, drones and electronic-warfare systems.³

The proposed joint production facility therefore represents a further deepening of the relationship.

It creates an uncomfortable question:

If Israeli military technology is increasingly integrated into Serbian industrial production, and Serbia simultaneously supplies Israel with military equipment and ammunition, where should the line be drawn between an arms customer, an arms supplier and a partner in the defence-industrial system?

3. The International-Law Problem

The legal issue is more complicated than simply stating that “Serbia is committing genocide.”

Such a statement would go beyond what has been legally established regarding Serbia’s own responsibility.

The more precise argument is that Serbia may incur international responsibility if it knowingly provides assistance that contributes to internationally wrongful acts, particularly where the supplier knows or should know of a serious risk that the assistance will facilitate violations of international humanitarian law.

The ICJ’s January 2024 order in South Africa v. Israel did not determine that Israel had committed genocide. It did, however, find that the rights claimed by South Africa under the Genocide Convention were plausible and ordered provisional measures designed to prevent acts falling within the Convention and to preserve evidence.⁴

The Court subsequently reaffirmed and modified provisional measures as the situation developed.

This creates an important international legal context for arms suppliers.

The ICJ’s April 2024 order in Nicaragua v. Germany stated that, in the context of military assistance and arms transfers, states have a duty to proactively ascertain whether weapons transferred to third parties might be used to commit breaches of international humanitarian law or the Genocide Convention.⁵

Consequently, a government cannot simply argue that it has no responsibility because another state ultimately fires the weapon.

The relevant question is whether the supplier exercised appropriate diligence and whether it knowingly contributed to a situation in which the transferred material could facilitate unlawful conduct.

4. Serbia Is Enabling Military Capacity

Serbia’s contribution should therefore be understood in terms of military capacity.

A country does not need to deploy its own soldiers to contribute to a war.

States contribute to wars through:

• ammunition;
• weapons;
• drones;
• artillery systems;
• components;
• military technology;
• intelligence;
• logistics;
• industrial production; and
• financial and political support.

Serbia’s arms relationship with Israel places it within this broader military supply chain.

The proposed joint production of combat drones makes the issue even more significant.

Drones have become one of the defining technologies of modern warfare. They can perform surveillance, targeting, reconnaissance and strike functions. Expanding the production of military drones therefore increases the availability of military capabilities that can be deployed in armed conflicts.

It would be inappropriate to claim that every Serbian-made drone will necessarily be used in Gaza.

But it is entirely legitimate to ask whether Serbia has adequately assessed the possibility that its military cooperation with Israel could facilitate unlawful conduct.

5. The Humanitarian Context Cannot Be Ignored

The military relationship between Serbia and Israel is taking place against the background of catastrophic humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

The war has produced enormous civilian suffering, mass displacement and destruction of civilian infrastructure. Israel has faced sustained international criticism concerning its conduct of military operations and restrictions on humanitarian assistance.

The international legal debate has also escalated considerably.

The ICJ proceedings concerning South Africa v. Israel concern allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention. The International Criminal Court has separately addressed alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the situation in the State of Palestine.

Therefore, the argument that arms transfers are simply an ordinary commercial transaction becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

When the recipient is engaged in an active military campaign that has generated extensive allegations of international crimes, the supplier has a heightened responsibility to examine the consequences of its exports.

6. Opportunism and Strategic Calculation

Serbia’s policy toward Israel can also be understood through the lens of political opportunism.

Belgrade has historically pursued a highly flexible foreign policy, attempting to maintain relationships with competing powers simultaneously.

Serbia seeks membership in the European Union while maintaining close relations with Russia and China. At the same time, it has developed increasingly significant military and technological relationships with Western states and Israel.

This flexibility can be advantageous for the Serbian government.

It allows Belgrade to acquire weapons, technology, investment and diplomatic support from multiple sides.

But from an ethical perspective, the strategy raises difficult questions.

If Serbia is willing to expand its defence relationship with Israel precisely while Israel is facing extensive international criticism over its conduct in Gaza, economic and strategic interests appear to be taking precedence over humanitarian concerns.

That is the central criticism of Serbia’s policy.

The accusation is not that Serbia is uniquely responsible for the war in Gaza.

Rather, it is that Serbia appears willing to profit from military cooperation while avoiding the moral and legal consequences of the use of the military capabilities it helps supply.

7. The Double Standard

The contrast becomes particularly striking when compared with European governments that have imposed restrictions on military exports to Israel because of concerns regarding international humanitarian law.

Germany, for example, announced in August 2025 that it would suspend exports of military equipment that could be used in Gaza until further notice.⁶ Slovenia imposed an arms embargo on Israel in July 2025, citing the humanitarian situation and international-law concerns.⁷

Serbia has instead moved in the opposite direction by deepening its military relationship with Israel and announcing joint production of combat drones.

This difference deserves attention.

If governments are expected to examine the foreseeable use of exported weapons, then the appropriate response to credible allegations of serious violations should be increased scrutiny, not deeper military integration.

8. Morally, the Policy Is Difficult to Defend

Even if one sets aside the most contentious legal questions, the ethical problem remains.

A government that supplies weapons to a state engaged in a devastating armed conflict cannot reasonably claim that the humanitarian consequences are entirely somebody else’s responsibility.

There is a difference between selling ordinary commercial goods and supplying military equipment.

Weapons exist specifically to enable the use of force.

When that force is being used in circumstances involving widespread civilian suffering and allegations of war crimes and genocide, arms suppliers have a moral responsibility to consider where their products may end up and how they may be used.

Serbia therefore faces an ethical choice.

It can continue treating military exports as a source of revenue and geopolitical leverage.

Or it can impose stronger safeguards and refuse military cooperation where there is a serious risk of facilitating international crimes.

The latter would be consistent with a foreign policy based on human rights and international law.

9. Is It Illegal?

The strongest legal formulation is not that every Serbian arms transaction with Israel is automatically illegal.

International law does not operate on such a simple basis.

Instead, legality depends on factors including the type of equipment, the circumstances of the transfer, the knowledge available to the exporting state, the foreseeable manner in which the equipment may be used, applicable arms-control obligations and the supplier’s due-diligence procedures.

However, the legal risks are real.

The ICJ has expressly recognized that states involved in military assistance and arms transfers must proactively assess whether weapons might contribute to violations of international humanitarian law or the Genocide Convention.⁸

Furthermore, customary international law concerning state responsibility recognizes that a state may incur responsibility for aiding or assisting another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act where the relevant legal conditions are satisfied.

Consequently, Serbia cannot reasonably treat the issue as entirely outside the scope of international law.

10. Conclusion

Serbia’s expanding military relationship with Israel raises serious political, ethical and legal concerns.

Serbia has supplied military equipment and ammunition to Israel. It has purchased substantial Israeli military technology. And in 2026, Belgrade announced plans for joint Serbian-Israeli production of combat drones.

These developments are occurring against the background of the Gaza war and extensive allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

The central issue is therefore not whether Serbia itself is bombing Gaza.

The issue is whether Serbia is contributing material military capacity to a state whose conduct is under intense international legal scrutiny.

There is a strong moral argument that it should not.

There is also a serious legal argument that Serbia must conduct rigorous due diligence and must not knowingly facilitate internationally wrongful acts.

And there is a political argument that profiting from military cooperation during a humanitarian catastrophe represents opportunism rather than principled foreign policy.

Serbia has a choice.

It can continue to deepen its defence-industrial relationship with Israel, treating weapons and drones as instruments of economic and geopolitical opportunity.

Or it can recognize that military cooperation carries responsibilities that cannot be separated from the consequences of military force.

At minimum, Serbia should suspend arms transfers and military-industrial cooperation where there is a substantial risk that the resulting equipment could facilitate violations of international humanitarian law or the Genocide Convention.

Anything less risks turning commercial transactions into participation in a system of military violence whose human consequences are impossible to ignore.

Notes

1. International Court of Justice, “Summary of the Order of 30 April 2024,” Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in Respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), April 30, 2024.
2. Reuters, “Serbia and Israel to Jointly Manufacture Combat Drones, Vucic Says,” April 14, 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. International Court of Justice, “Summary of the Order of 26 January 2024,” Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), January 26, 2024.
5. International Court of Justice, “Summary of the Order of 30 April 2024.”
6. Reuters, “Germany to Halt Military Exports That Could Be Used in Gaza,” August 8, 2025.
7. Reuters, “Slovenia Imposes Arms Embargo on Israel,” July 31, 2025.
8. International Court of Justice, “Summary of the Order of 30 April 2024.”