(The period 1966–1974: how Yugoslavia changed, how Kosovo changed, and why this period remains controversial for Albanians and Serbs)

Written by: Nehat Hyseni

The political history of socialist Yugoslavia between 1966 and 1974 constitutes one of the most important and complex periods in the development of the Yugoslav federation. Within just eight years, the state that had been built on a relatively centralized model after World War II underwent a profound process of decentralization, federalization, and constitutional reorganization.

At the center of this turn was the political downfall of Aleksandar Ranković at the IV Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held in Brijuni on July 1, 1966.

Ranković was no ordinary functionary. He had been one of the most powerful men in Tito’s system, responsible for the state security apparatus and a key figure in the centralist wing of the Party. Therefore, his removal was not simply a personal punishment for a secret service functionary. It marked a major shift in the internal balance of Yugoslav power.

The historical question is: why did Ranković fall?

Was the main cause the misuse of the UDB, the surveillance and wiretapping of Tito himself and the top leadership? Or was it the repressive policy of the security apparatus towards Albanians, especially in Kosovo? Or, more deeply, was its downfall part of a political conflict between two concepts for the future of Yugoslavia: a more centralized Yugoslavia, where Serbia had great weight, and an increasingly decentralized federation, in which the republics and provinces would gain new powers?

The most historically convincing answer is that all of these elements were intertwined, but at different levels.

Ranković and the centralist model

Aleksandar Ranković was one of the founding figures of the post-war Yugoslav security apparatus. For many years he was one of Josip Broz Tito’s closest associates.

The UDB apparatus he led had acquired extraordinary power. The problem was not just the existence of a powerful security service. The problem was that the service had created opportunities for extensive surveillance of political and social life.

In the years before 1966, the UDB had also been active in Kosovo. Albanians experienced controls, investigations, surveillance and various repressive measures, while the issue of weapons, especially the 1956 action, left a severe political and social trauma. Historical studies link the Ranković period with a security policy that was particularly suspicious of Albanians.

But another simplification must be avoided: all of Yugoslavia’s policies towards Albanians cannot be attributed to Ranković personally alone. State policy was the result of entire party, police and administrative structures. Therefore, the notion of “Rankovićism” is broader than the person Ranković himself.

Did Ranković fall because of Albanians?

This is one of the most interesting questions of this period.

After 1966, it became increasingly clear in Yugoslav political discourse that the security apparatus had committed “deformations” and violations, especially in Kosovo. In the political discussions of that time, discriminatory practices and violations of the constitutional rights of Albanians were criticized. In this sense, the Albanian experience in Kosovo became one of the most powerful arguments against the old security system.

But it would be historically inaccurate to say that Ranković was overthrown only because he mistreated Albanians.

The Brijuni Plenum was not a trial for Kosovo. It was a battle for control of the state and the Party. Historical studies emphasize that the Kosovo issue was part of a broader political process and that Ranković became a symbol of the centralist model that the new leadership was trying to replace.

So, Albanians were not the only cause of Ranković’s downfall. But the Albanian issue and the UDB’s practices in Kosovo became one of the most important proofs of the failure of the Ranković model.

3. Was Tito a victim of surveillance?

Here lies the second key to the matter.

In 1966, the so-called “wiretapping affair” broke out. Accusations were made that the security apparatus had also wiretapped Josip Broz Tito and other people in the top leadership.

At the Brijuni Plenum, the UDB was accused of exceeding its powers and of rising above party and state structures. Ranković became the main political figure responsible for this situation.

However, even today the issue of wiretapping is not completely closed in historiography. Archival studies have discussed the nature and extent of the wiretapping, the concrete responsibility of Ranković, and the way in which the issue was used politically. Some literature considers the wiretapping as a real fact, while the debate continues over Ranković’s personal responsibility and how large a political part the affair was constructed.

This leads us to an important conclusion:

Tito did not need to overthrow Ranković just because of the Albanians. If the security service had begun to supervise the president and the state leadership itself, then the danger to Tito’s personal authority was much more direct.

In this sense, the Albanian issue and the issue of wiretapping should not be pitted against each other. They were two dimensions of the same crisis of the security system.

Brionet 1966 – the end of an era

The Fourth Brioni Plenum was a turning point.

Ranković lost all his political and state functions and left the political scene. His associates in the security structures were also affected.

But the most important consequence was not just personal.

With the fall of Ranković, the centralist wing, which saw the strengthening of the federation and its control over the republics and provinces as a guarantee of stability, lost political power.

Instead, Edvard Kardelj’s concept of a more decentralized Yugoslavia, with more powers for the republics, provinces, and self-government structures, began to gain strength.

Therefore, the Brijuni of 1966 can be interpreted as the beginning of the deepening federalization of Yugoslavia. Studies of political history see Ranković’s departure as the moment when the centralist model lost one of its most powerful representatives.

Kosovo after 1966: from police control to institutional emancipation

For Kosovo Albanians, the change was extraordinary.

After 1966, a new political period began. Kosovo did not immediately become a republic and the Albanians did not win all their demands. But the political climate changed.

In 1967, Tito visited Kosovo. In 1967–1968, important constitutional and institutional changes began. In 1968, the federal authorities introduced changes that expanded Kosovo’s powers in the legislative and judicial fields and gave it direct representation in the Federal Parliament. In 1969, Kosovo adopted its own Constitutional Law.

But the decisive moment was the Albanian demonstrations of 1968.

Albanian students and youth demanded more national rights, the use of the flag, the advancement of Albanian education, and, above all, the status of a republic.

The demand for the Republic of Kosovo was much more than a slogan. It expressed a gradually developing conviction among Albanians that the status of an autonomous province did not guarantee full political equality with the republics of Yugoslavia.

The 1968 demonstrations thus marked the transition of Albanians from a largely defensive policy to a more active policy of demanding constitutional equality.

University of Pristina – institution who changed history

One of the most important results of this period was the creation of the University of Pristina.

The university was founded in 1970. It was not just an educational institution. For the Albanians of Kosovo, the university became an institution of national, social, cultural and intellectual emancipation.

For the first time, a large generation of Albanians could be educated in the Albanian language at high levels without being forced to leave for studies in Albania or other republics of Yugoslavia.

This changed the social structure of Kosovo.

A new class of professors, lawyers, economists, doctors, engineers, sociologists, historians, and administrative staff was created. The university created a new Albanian elite, which would later play an important role in the political and institutional life of Kosovo.

Therefore, the establishment of the University of Pristina should be seen not only as an educational reform, but as one of the most important results of the political transformation after 1966.

Constitutional amendments: from the 1963 Constitution to the 1974 system

An important chronological distinction must be made here.

The 1963 Constitution of Yugoslavia was still built on a structure where the powers of the provinces were significantly more limited.

Under the 1963 system, the rights of autonomous provinces were largely determined by the respective republic. In the case of Kosovo, this meant a strong dependence on Serbia.

After 1966, a gradual process of constitutional changes began.

The first changes were made in 1967. Then came the changes of 1968 and, finally, the major reform of 1971.

It should be noted that Amendments XX–XLII were adopted on June 30, 1971. They constituted one of the most important steps towards the further federalization of Yugoslavia.

What Amendments XX–XLII brought about of 1971?

The 1971 amendments changed the constitutional philosophy of the federation.

Amendment XX formulated a new concept of sovereignty: sovereign rights were realized in the socialist republics and autonomous provinces, while in the federation only in those areas that were defined as common interest. At the same time, Kosovo and Vojvodina were clearly defined as autonomous units within the SFRY and Serbia.

This was a very big change.

The federation was no longer simply a center that granted powers to its units. Powers began to move from the center to the republics and provinces.

Even more importantly, the constitutional amendments strengthened the principle of the consent of the republics and provinces in the process of amending the Constitution. Amendment XXXII required the consent of the republics and provinces for significant constitutional changes.

This was the political and legal basis of what would later become one of the most important characteristics of the 1974 system: decision-making through consensus and not simply through outright voting.

Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia – 1971

Another historical change was the creation of a new form of collective leadership.

In 1971, the system of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia was established. This was a clear signal that the federation was preparing for a future in which power would not rest solely on the personal figure of Tito.

In practice, the system was supposed to create a collective mechanism for representing federal units.

This process was further consolidated with the 1974 Constitution, which established a collective Presidency with representation of the republics and autonomous regions. International documents describe the 1974 Constitution as a step towards a federal-confederal relationship and emphasize the equal representation of the six republics and two autonomous regions in the collective Presidency.

Thus, Tito was also preparing Yugoslavia after Tito.

The year 1974 – the peak of transformation

The 1974 federal constitution was the culmination of the process begun in 1966.

It transformed Yugoslavia into an extremely decentralized system. The republics and autonomous provinces gained much greater political, economic, and constitutional powers.

For Kosovo, the change was historic.

Kosovo legally continued to be an “autonomous province” within Serbia, but the powers it gained were much greater than those of the previous period.

The Constitution of Kosovo was adopted on February 28, 1974. It granted Kosovo a high degree of constitutional, legislative, and judicial autonomy.

Kosovo gained its own political, economic, and judicial institutions, including an Assembly, a Government, and a judicial system. Under the 1974 system, Kosovo had powers that in many areas approached those of the republics.

However, there was a fundamental difference: Kosovo did not have the formal status of a republic and did not have the same constitutional right of secession attributed to republics.

Therefore, the formulation that “Kosovo became a republic” is not legally correct.

But it would be equally incorrect to claim that Kosovo remained just an ordinary administrative province.

In the political and institutional practice of Yugoslavia in 1974, Kosovo came extremely close to the position of a federal unit.

What did Kosovo gain?

The balance of the years 1966–1974 is important for Kosovo Albanians.

They won:

● expansion of political autonomy;

● expansion of constitutional powers;

● more direct representation in federal institutions;

● greater use and affirmation of the Albanian language;

● University of Pristina;

● development of higher education in the Albanian language;

● the creation of a new intellectual elite;

● development of cultural institutions;

● the advancement of the Albanian administration;

● greater representation of Albanians in public institutions.

But these gains did not come only from Belgrade’s political “donation”.

They were the result of a combination of several factors: the change in federal policy after 1966, the reforms of Tito and Kardelj, Albanian political mobilization, the demonstrations of 1968, the demographic and educational development of Albanians, and the need of the Yugoslav system to create a new balance between nations and nationalities.

But what didn’t Kosovo win?

Herein lies the historical paradox.

Kosovo gained a lot, but it did not gain what Albanians demanded in 1968: a Republic.

This created a contradiction that would explode later.

If Kosovo had an Assembly, a government, a judicial system, a constitution, a university, federal representation, and broad powers, then why didn’t it have the status of a republic?

This question would become one of the main issues of Albanian politics in the 1970s and especially in the demonstrations of 1981.

Thus, the 1974 Constitution was both the culmination of Albanian institutional emancipation and the source of a new political discontent.

What did Serbia gain?

This question is equally important in a serious analysis.

From the Serbian perspective, the 1966–1974 reform brought about a weakening of the position of the Republic of Serbia within the federation, because Vojvodina and Kosovo gained broad competencies and more direct ties to the federation.

This created what was later perceived in Serbian politics as a “weakening of Serbia.”

But from the Yugoslav perspective, Tito and Kardelj saw this not necessarily as a weakening of Serbia, but as a mechanism to prevent the dominance of one entity over the others.

Herein lies one of Yugoslavia’s fundamental dilemmas:

Was decentralization the path to equality of nations, or the path to the dissolution of the state?

In the 1960s, Tito and Kardelj believed mainly in the former.

The history of the 1980s and 1990s would show that there could also be elements of the latter.

1974–1980: Tito’s system at its peak

The 1974 Constitution was not simply a legal document. It was a complex political compromise.

Tito had realized that Yugoslavia could not be maintained through centralization alone. The republics had different economic and political interests, and the national question had become increasingly sensitive.

Therefore, a system was built where:

The more power was given to the federal units, the more a collective mechanism had to be created to hold the federation together.

The collective presidency was part of this mechanism.

But this system also had a weakness: it worked much better as long as an arbitrary authority like Tito existed.

Tito was a figure who could mediate between Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

After his death in 1980, the question was whether institutions could replace Tito’s personal authority.

This is where the 1974 model crisis began.

Was Ranković’s fall an Albanian victory?

The answer should be: yes, but not only Albanians.

For Albanians, Ranković’s fall signified the end of a period where the security apparatus had exerted great pressure on Albanian society.

But from the perspective of all of Yugoslavia, its fall was also a victory of decentralization over centralism.

Therefore, Ranković should not be seen only as the “enemy of the Albanians”, while Tito should only be seen as the “liberator of the Albanians”.

Tito did not undertake this process simply out of kindness to the Albanians. He needed a stable Yugoslavia, where neither Serbia, nor Croatia, nor Slovenia, nor any other entity dominated the system.

In this sense, the Albanian issue became part of a broader project of restructuring Yugoslavia.

16. The great paradox: Ranković fell, but the problem did not disappear

One of the biggest mistakes in political analysis is to think that with the fall of Ranković, the Albanian problem was solved.

It was not resolved.

The system was changed.

Rights were expanded.

Institutions were created.

But the contradictions remained.

Kosovo remained economically among the poorest areas of Yugoslavia. Economic inequality did not disappear. Relations between Kosovo and Serbia remained complicated. Meanwhile, the growth of Albanian education and national consciousness created new political demands.

This is one of the paradoxes of modernization:

The more education, institutions, and political awareness Albanian society gained, the greater its political demands became.

Therefore, the reform aimed at stabilizing Yugoslavia also created a more organized, more educated, and more aware Albanian society of its position.

17. From 1966 to 1974: eight years that changed history

If we analyze the period chronologically, the picture becomes clear:

1966 – The fall of Ranković and the Brioni Plenum.

1967 – Beginning of a series of constitutional changes and the gradual strengthening of the republics and provinces.

1968 – Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo and demands for a Republic; significant changes in the institutional position of Kosovo.

1969 – Kosovo gains its Constitutional Law.

1970 – Establishment of the University of Pristina.

1971 – Amendments XX–XLII and strengthening of the autonomy of the republics and provinces; consolidation of the collective Presidency.

1974 – New federal constitution and the Constitution of Kosovo; the culmination of decentralization and autonomy of Kosovo.

This was not a series of disconnected events.

It was a single historical process.

Conclusion: between repression, reform and fear of disintegration

The fall of Aleksandar Ranković cannot be explained in one sentence.

It is not enough to say that he fell because the UDB had abused power.

It is not enough to say that he fell because Kosovo Albanians were victims of his policies.

And it is not enough to say that Tito was only afraid of surveillance.

In reality, these elements merged into a much deeper crisis.

The UDB had become too powerful. Ranković had become a symbol of centralism. Repressive practices against Albanians had created a major political problem in Kosovo. The wiretapping of the top leadership made the crisis even more dangerous for Tito. Meanwhile, Tito and Kardelj were trying to build a new, more decentralized and balanced Yugoslavia.

Therefore, the Brijuni Plenum should be seen as a meeting point between the conflict over power, the reform of the federation, the crisis of the security apparatus, and the Albanian national issue.

For Albanians, this period was the beginning of a new era: from fear of the security apparatus to institutional affirmation.

For Serbs, it was the beginning of a process that would increasingly be seen as a weakening of Serbia’s position.

For Tito, it was an attempt to save Yugoslavia through a new system of balances.

For historians, it is an extraordinary political laboratory: a multinational state that tried to solve the problem of nationalism by decentralizing power.

And herein lies the tragedy of Yugoslav history.

The 1974 system succeeded in granting Kosovo Albanians an extraordinary degree of autonomy and institutional affirmation, but it failed to convince all Albanians that autonomy was equivalent to a republic. At the same time, it failed to convince all Serbs that decentralization was not a weakening of Serbia.

This contradiction would remain hidden for several years under Tito’s authority.

After 1980, it would surface.

The demonstrations of 1981, the economic crisis, political clashes in Serbia and Kosovo, the rise of Serbian nationalism, and then the constitutional changes of 1988–1989 would gradually overturn the balance established in 1974.

Therefore, to understand the Kosovo crisis in the 1980s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, we must go back precisely to July 1, 1966.

Because that’s where one of the biggest turning points in the history of Yugoslavia began:

from Ranković to Tito of decentralization; from UDB to reform; from supervised Kosovo to institutional Kosovo; from the 1963 Constitution to the 1974 constitutional system.

And that is why the period 1966–1974 is not just history. It is one of the keys to understanding Albanian-Serbian relations, the status of Kosovo, and the crisis that would erupt a decade later.

Pristina, August 27, 2026