(From the designation “Muslim” to “Bosnian” and from religion to language, culture and tradition in the Albanian case)
Written by: Nehat Hyseni
The political history of Southeast Europe knows few cases where the issue of naming a human community has had such great political, legal, and existential weight as the case of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of the 20th century. The clash between the designations “Muslim” and “Bosniak” was not simply a terminological debate. It touched on the fundamental question: what constitutes a nation – religion, territory, language, culture, history, collective consciousness, or a combination of these?
This question took on extraordinary importance on the eve of Yugoslav political pluralism and especially in the first multi-party elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. At that moment, two political concepts emerged within the Bosnian Muslim intellectual and political elite itself.
One concept, represented mainly by Alija Izetbegović and the Stranka demokratske akcije – SDA, considered “Muslim” as a separate nation in the national sense used by the Yugoslav system. The initial program of the SDA sought to affirm the national identity of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, linking it closely to the history, culture, and religion of Islam.
The other concept, represented by Adil Zulfikarpashiq and academic Muhamed Filipovic, sought the return of the name Bosniak, considering it more suitable for national definition and aiming for religion not to be the main criterion of nationality.
The historical paradox lies in the fact that precisely this second concept, which in 1990 was politically much weaker, would later become the dominant concept. The SDA itself, after only a few years, embraced the term Bosniak, which was institutionalized in 1993. The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirms that since 1971 “Muslim” has been accepted as a national designation, while since 1993 the name “Bosniak” has been used.
This development offers an extraordinary opportunity to compare the Bosnian case with the Albanian one.
The 1990 Pluralist Elections and the Two Concepts of Bosnian Identity
The first pluralist elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held on November 18, 1990, as part of the democratization process of the Yugoslav republics. Their results marked a historic turning point.
Three parties built primarily on the basis of national identity dominated the political scene: the Muslim SDA, the Serb SDS, and the Croat HDZ. In the Republican Assembly, the SDA won 43 seats in the Chamber of Citizens, the SDS 34, and the HDZ 21; in the overall structure of both chambers, the three national parties received an overwhelming majority of seats.
In this process, the MBO – Muslim-Bosnian Organization, led by Adil Zulfikarpašić and intellectually supported by Muhamed Filipović, remained a much smaller force. It received about 1.2 percent of the vote and only two seats in the republican parliament.
Here lies one of the most interesting paradoxes of Bosnian political history:
The concept that politically lost in 1990 – the Bosnian concept – ultimately won on the terminological and national level.
Meanwhile, the concept that won the elections – the political concept of “Muslims” – was later transformed into the concept of “Bosniak”.
This change should not be interpreted simply as a personal defeat or victory of any leader. It was the result of changing historical circumstances. By 1990, “Muslim” was an already institutionalized category in Yugoslavia. In the conditions of war, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the need for a national entity directly related to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the name “Bosniak” became politically and diplomatically more functional.
The paradox of the concept of “Muslim as a nation”
The main theoretical problem with the concept of “Muslim” lies in its ambiguity. In everyday language, “Muslim” is a religious designation. It means a person who belongs to Islam.
In the Yugoslav constitutional system, however, “Muslim” with a capital M was transformed into a national category.
This was a unique political-historical construction of socialist Yugoslavia. After 1945, the status of Bosnian Muslims went through several phases. In the 1961 census, the possibility of being defined as “Muslim” in the ethnic sense appeared, while in the 1971 census, it became possible to declare oneself as “Muslim in the national sense”. The 1974 Constitution recognized Muslims as one of the equal constituent nations.
This created an unusual situation in the theory of the nation. A term that in most European contexts meant religion, in Yugoslavia was used as a national name.
This does not mean that the identity of Bosnian Muslims was “only religious.” On the contrary, it included a distinct history, culture, collective memory, traditions, literature, territory, and shared consciousness. But the terminological problem was real: the name of the nation coincided with the name of the religion.
This would create great difficulties once Bosnia entered the arena of international politics.
In a Europe where nation and religion are usually treated as distinct categories, the statement that “Serbs are Orthodox, Croats are Catholic, and Muslims are Muslims” created the impression of an identity triangle where religion and nationality were almost equivalent.
This is one of the conceptual problems that must be handled carefully.
Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic:
Bosnian nation beyond religion.
Adil Zulfikarpashiqi had long promoted the idea of bošnjaštvo, that is, Bosniakness as a national identity linked to Bosnia and its history.
In 1990, he and Muhamed Filipović positioned themselves in favor of a concept where Bosnian nationality should not be reduced to Islamic affiliation.
This was a point of difference of strategic importance.
According to this view, a Bosniak could be a Muslim, but the logical relationship should not be:
Muslim = Bosnian.
This was particularly important for the project of a multiethnic and multiconfessional Bosnia.
If “Bosnian” is a national category and “Muslim” is a religious category, then a person can be both Bosnian and Muslim, but conceptually these are two different dimensions of identity.
This is where the historical importance of Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic lies.
They understood that a modern European nation should have a national name that does not condition affiliation with religion.
However, this concept failed to become dominant in the 1990 elections. The MBO only won two mandates. The SDA, meanwhile, won convincingly and represented the majority of Bosnia’s Muslim electorate.
The initial SDA program described the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “Bosnian people” with its own history, culture, religion, and traditions, but politically it continued to function under the category of “Muslim.” The SDA’s founding document presented this community as an indigenous people of Bosnia and demanded recognition of its national distinctiveness.
So, the contradiction was more terminological and conceptual than a lack of national awareness.
From “Muslim” to “Bosnian”:
the change of 1993
The development of the war in Bosnia radically changed the context. In 1993, in the conditions of war and the internationalization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue, the name Bosniak made a strong comeback.
On September 27, 1993, the Assembly of Bosniaks was held in Sarajevo, which marked the political and symbolic return of the name Bosniak as a national name.
This was a historic turning point.
If in 1990 “Muslim” was the dominant political designation, only three years later the designation “Bosniak” became the national name.
Thus an extraordinary historical paradox was created:
Zulfikarpashiq and Filipovic lost the 1990 elections, but their idea for a Bosnian national name won the long battle of identity.
Meanwhile, the SDA, which initially opposed the concept of Bosniakness as a political alternative to “Muslim”, eventually embraced it.
This shift shows that national identities are not always products of an unchanging formula. They can evolve under the influence of history, war, institutions, diplomacy, and the need for self-determination.
The Albanian case: the nation is not defined by religion
Here the fundamental difference between the Bosnian and Albanian cases appears.
Albanians have not built the modern nation on a religious identity.
An Albanian can be Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox, Bektashi, or not practicing any religion, without ceasing to be Albanian.
The main criteria of Albanian national identity are built on a combination of:
● language;
● culture;
● history;
● tradition;
● collective memory;
● national origin and awareness;
● connection with the Albanian historical space.
This is one of the most important features of Albanian nation-building.
In this sense, the Albanian formula is not:
nor Muslim = Albanian,
nor Catholic = Albanian,
nor Orthodox = Albanian.
The Albanian formula is:
Albanian + Muslim,
Albanian + Catholic,
Albanian + Orthodox,
Albanian + Bektashi,
but religion does not define the nation.
This feature has made Albanian identity relatively resistant to confessional divisions.
Albania as an example of difference
between nation and religion
The case of Albania is particularly significant. Albania is a society with a multi-religious heritage. Muslims make up a significant portion of the population, but throughout Albanian history they have coexisted with Catholics, Orthodox, and Bektashis.
This coexistence is not simply a modern political formula. It is part of the structure of Albanian national history.
The Constitution of the Republic of Albania expressly links national identity with religious coexistence and considers religious coexistence one of the foundations of the state.
This is also very important for the contemporary debate.
In the Albanian case, religion is a dimension of personal and community identity, while nationality is another dimension.
This division has made it possible for an Albanian to preserve his religion without turning it into a criterion of national belonging.
Therefore, it is wrong to explain Albanians in a reductive manner through the religious category.
Albanians are not a “Muslim nation”, even though a significant portion of Albanians are Muslims.
Likewise, Albanians are not a Catholic nation, even though Catholicism has played an extraordinary role in the history of Albanian culture and literature.
And Albanians are not an Orthodox nation, even though Orthodoxy is an important part of Albanian heritage.
The Albanian nation encompasses all of these traditions without identifying exclusively with any of them.
Albanian-Bosnian similarities
However, the comparison should not be made only on the differences.
There are also important similarities.
First, both Albanians and Bosniaks went through long periods of Ottoman rule and developed a significant part of their culture in contact with Islam.
Second, both peoples have experienced different attempts to define them from the outside.
Third, both identities have been intertwined with complex processes of modernization, nationalism, and political transformation in the Balkans.
Fourth, in both cases there is a strong element of national self-determination.
But this is where the main difference begins. Bosniaks, in their modern process of nation-building, faced the need to move from a national name with a religious connotation – “Muslim” – to a territorial-historical national name – “Bosnian”.
Albanians, on the other hand, already had a national name that was not religious.
The designation “Albanian” is not a religious category.
This is a fundamental conceptual difference.
Bosnian Triads and Albanian Pluralism
One of the most well-known characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the historical connection between:
Serbs – Orthodoxy;
Croats – Catholicism;
Bosniaks – Islam.
This should not be interpreted in an absolute way, because there are individuals and communities that do not fit into this scheme.
But in Bosnia’s political history, religion has been a much more direct factor in shaping national identities than in the Albanian case.
This is also one of the sources of the Bosnian tragedy.
When nationality and religion strongly overlap, political conflict can much more easily take on an identity and existential character.
In the Albanian case, on the contrary, an Albanian Muslim and an Albanian Catholic may have important religious differences, but they do not make them members of different nations.
This creates a wider space of national belonging.
This is precisely one of the reasons why Albanian religious pluralism is not necessarily a threat to national unity. On the contrary, it can be part of it.
The danger of reducing the nation to religion
From the perspective of the sociology of the nation, the reduction of national identity to religion creates several problems.
First, it narrows the definition of the nation.
Second, it can create an internal exception.
Third, it makes national identity more vulnerable to political instrumentalization.
Fourth, it can feed stereotypes from outside.
If a nation is identified primarily through religion, then political opponents may attempt to portray it not as a national community, but as a religious community.
This is particularly problematic in modern Europe.
A nation cannot be reduced to the religion of its majority.
Serbs are not just Orthodox either.
Croatians are not just Catholics either.
Bosniaks are not just Muslims either.
Albanians are not just Muslims either.
In a democratic Europe, national identity, religious identity, and civic identity must be conceptually distinct, even when they coexist in the same individual.
Contemporary debate: criticism of Islamism should not turn into hostility towards Islam
This issue takes on particular importance in today’s Europe.
In recent decades, political movements and discourses have emerged that criticize Islam, Muslim immigration, Islamism, or the public role of Islamic institutions. Some of these criticisms are a legitimate part of democratic debate.
A liberal democracy should allow criticism of any religion, ideology, and religious institution.
Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between:
criticism of political Islamism,
criticism of religious extremism,
criticism of certain organizations or practices,
and:
discrimination or hatred towards Muslims as people.
These are not the same thing.
A Euro-Atlantic society must have the democratic capacity to do both simultaneously:
to combat extremism and protect religious freedom;
to oppose radicalism and oppose discrimination;
to defend secularism and protect freedom of conscience.
This is the approach that best corresponds to the Western liberal tradition.
Even European institutions today make precisely this distinction. The European Commission highlights the rise of anti-Muslim hatred and discrimination and considers protection from religiously motivated hatred part of the European order of fundamental rights.
The Council of Europe, meanwhile, has developed specific standards against anti-Muslim racism and discrimination, emphasizing that Muslims are an integral part of European diversity.
Therefore, in a serious Euro-Atlantic debate, criticism of Islam as a religion or of Islamism as an ideology must be argued with academic and democratic standards, not with collective stereotypes.
Why is this difference important to Albanians?
This debate has direct importance for Albanians as well.
Albanians are one of the most important examples of a European nation with a multiple religious heritage.
Precisely for this reason, any attempt to define the Albanian nation solely through Islam would be historically inaccurate and sociologically reductive.
But equally wrong would be the attempt to discredit Islam as part of Albanian history and identity.
The right approach is:
to separate religion from nation, without separating religion from history.
Islam is part of Albanian history.
Catholicism is part of Albanian history.
Orthodoxy is part of Albanian history.
Bektashism is part of Albanian history.
But none of them is equal to the Albanian nation.
This is precisely what makes the Albanian model of identity unique.
Lessons from Bosnia
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the Bosnian experience.
First, the name of the nation has political and legal significance.
Second, a name that has religious meaning can create confusion when used as a national category.
Third, the modern nation must have a foundation that includes history, culture, language, territory, and collective consciousness.
Fourth, the change from “Muslim” to “Bosnian” shows that national identities can evolve.
Fifth, the Bosnian experience shows that religious identity can be a very powerful component of the nation, but it is not necessarily the same thing as the nation.
In this sense, the transition from “Muslim” to “Bosnian” can be seen as an attempt to place national identity on a broader historical and territorial basis.
Learning from Albanians
The Albanian experience presents a different model. Albanians did not need to change their national name from a religious category to a national category, because the name “Albanian” was already independent of religion.
This gave the Albanian nation an important advantage in the process of national consolidation. The Albanian language became one of the main pillars of identity.
Literature, tradition, historical memory, culture and the idea of the homeland became unifying elements. Therefore, in the Albanian case, religion did not disappear from the national identity, but was placed within it as a component, not as an exclusionary criterion. This distinction must be preserved even today.
Conclusion
The comparison between Bosniaks and Albanians leads us to an important sociological and political conclusion:
Religion can be part of the nation, but it is not necessarily the nation.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the historical experience of the 20th century created a situation where the term “Muslim” was institutionalized as a national name. The pluralist elections of 1990 clearly demonstrated this reality: Alija Izetbegović’s SDA won the majority of the votes of the Muslim electorate, while the MBO of Zulfikarpaššić and Filipović, which defended the Bosniak concept, received only two mandates.
But history took a turn. Just three years later, the name Bosniak was restored as a national name.
This proves that history does not always move in a straight line and that the political defeat of an idea at one point does not necessarily mean its historical defeat.
In the Albanian case, the situation is different. An Albanian is not defined by their religion, but by a much broader historical, linguistic, cultural and national complex.
This is a heritage that must be preserved.
In a Europe characterized by migration, cultural pluralism, secularism, the revival of religious identities and at the same time the growth of some forms of extremism, Albanians have the opportunity to present an important model of coexistence:
different religions, one nation;
different beliefs, one culture;
different traditions, one language;
different religious identities, a national affiliation.
This model should not be idealized or romanticized. But it deserves serious study. For the Euro-Atlantic public, the main message should be clear:
The fight against religious extremism is necessary, but it cannot turn into a war against a religion or against its believers.
At the same time, protecting religious freedom should not mean silence in the face of radicalism, fundamentalism, or the political instrumentalization of religion. Liberal democracy must uphold both standards simultaneously.
This is also the most important lesson that can be drawn from the comparison between Bosnia and Albanians.
The nation should not be built against religion, but neither should religion become the boundary of the nation.
In the Albanian case, this has been one of the most important pillars of national survival and consolidation.
In the Bosnian case, the transition from “Muslim” to “Bosnian” was a historical attempt to transform a strong religious-cultural identity into a broader national identity, suitable for a multiethnic state and a modern Europe.
And here lies the essential difference:
Bosniakness had to be terminologically separated from the equation of nation with religion; Albanianness, in essence, did not need such a separation, because the name of the Albanian nation was independent of religious affiliation.
This is not only a historical distinction, but a distinction of great importance for understanding the Balkans, national identities, and the region’s European future.
Conclusion for Euro-Atlantic opinion
In a Europe that aims to be a community of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, national identity cannot be treated as synonymous with religion.
But religion cannot be treated as an element foreign to European history either.
Bosnia and Albanians offer two different experiences.
Bosnia shows how a religious identity institutionalized as a nationality can evolve towards a broader national name.
Albanians show how a nation with three main religious traditions can build its identity on language, culture, history, and national consciousness, without excluding religion from its heritage.
For this reason, instead of the old question “are Albanians Muslim or Christian?”, the right question is:
How have Albanians, despite religious differences, managed to remain a national community?
And the answer that emerges from history is: because Albanianness is broader than religion.
This is not a weakness of Albanian identity.
It’s actually one of his greatest strengths.
In the same way, recognition of Bosnian identity should not mean reducing Bosniaks to Islam alone. Bosniaks are a nation with their own history, culture, language and memory, while Islam is a central component of the history and identity of the majority of them.
This clear separation between nation and religion, without denying the historical connection between them, is perhaps the most appropriate approach for a Balkans that aims to be an inseparable part of Euro-Atlantic Europe.
Pristina, August 31, 2026
