Greek Propaganda, Hellenist Expansionism and Megali Idea, 1830s–1955

Abstract

Greek propaganda was a long-term political and cultural tool aimed at strengthening Greek national claims against the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey. It started in the nineteenth century and grew through religious activity, education, political organization, demographic claims, the press, and international lobbying. I focus especially on how Greek interests were presented to European and American audiences to build support for territorial claims in Ottoman lands.

One early example is the distribution of Greek-language religious publications in Anatolia. In 1834, Reverend J. Brewer spread Bible Society materials in Greek letters across several towns. These efforts helped spread the Greek language, education, and national consciousness among Orthodox Christians. Greek schools played a similar role. In Cyprus, British High Commissioner Haynes Smith noted in 1900 that the Greek educational system was shaped by propaganda, turning schools into tools for building national identity.

In Crete, the focus was on the treatment of Christians under Ottoman rule. Reports of Turks massacring Christians were used to mobilize European opinion behind the Greek cause. Violence against Muslims during the revolt was instead framed as a fight for national independence. The success of this movement later helped Eleftherios Venizelos push for Greek expansion into Western Anatolia.

By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the emphasis shifted to demographic and territorial arguments. Propaganda claimed large Greek populations existed in Western Anatolia, especially around Smyrna. Maps, statistics, books, and other publications backed these claims so effectively that even some Turkish geographical works repeated the idea of a particularly large Greek population in Smyrna. Demographics thus became central to the political case for Greek territorial claims.

World War I brought a major expansion. From 1918, under Venizelos, Greek propaganda became more organized and international. The government worked through committees, associations, and pressure groups in Western capitals. London was the most important center because of Britain’s influence over the postwar Ottoman settlement; Paris mattered for the peace negotiations. The campaign targeted not only the public but also politicians, diplomats, journalists, and academics.

It intensified in 1919. Dr. Ronald Burrows, a Classics professor at the University of London and strong supporter of Greece, helped drive the pro-Greek campaign in the British press. Reports of alleged Turkish atrocities against Christians were a key element. Greek networks also sought to influence figures linked to the Paris Peace Conference, including contacts with Georges Clemenceau and conference secretary M. Dutasta.

The Greek landing at Smyrna in May 1919 was the turning point. Earlier propaganda had already established the idea of a large Greek population in Western Anatolia, so the occupation could be presented as protecting existing Greeks rather than pure expansion. It was also claimed to be a military action compatible with the armistice, leaving Ottoman sovereignty formally intact. Religious figures mattered too: Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Smyrna blessed the troops and had ties to earlier propaganda and armed groups.

During the occupation, reports circulated that Turks had massacred Greeks. Greek and Cypriot scouts, priests, Red Cross personnel, and others took part. Propaganda also targeted the local population—one example is the transfer of 250,000 lira to the Aydın and Nazilli regions to support the Greek administration. The effort therefore worked on two levels: internationally to keep support for Greece, and locally to legitimize Greek rule.

Private networks and money were crucial. Basil Zaharoff acted as an important patron of the occupation; his resources and connections helped shape coverage in the European and American press. Propaganda went far beyond newspapers and official statements—it involved money, personal relationships, lobbying, religious institutions, education, and organized associations.

Turkish authors and officials responded by arguing that Greece had successfully cast itself as the victim and convinced international opinion that its claims were legitimate. The conflict was therefore not only military and diplomatic but also a struggle over perception and historical interpretation.

The propaganda did not end with the Greek defeat in Anatolia in 1922. Its narratives continued to influence Greek-Turkish relations afterward. Issues around the Greek population of Anatolia, compensation claims, and the treatment of Greeks in Turkey remained contentious. Around the 1955 crisis, propaganda in Greece reached another peak.

Overall, I see Greek propaganda as a continuous process rather than a single wartime campaign. It grew from nineteenth-century religious and educational work into an organized international operation.

Its main methods were promoting Greek national identity, claims of Christian victimhood, demographic statistics, maps, historical arguments, press campaigns, political lobbying, religious influence, and financial networks.

The period from 1918 to 1922 receives the strongest emphasis, when these tools were combined to support territorial claims in Western Anatolia and the occupation of Smyrna. After the military defeat, the same narratives continued to shape discussions about Greek communities, territorial claims, and relations between Greece and Turkey.

Introduction

Greek propaganda directed toward Ottoman territories developed over more than a century. It began with religious and educational activity among Orthodox Christian communities and gradually developed into a political system designed to strengthen Greek national identity, advance territorial claims, influence foreign governments, and shape international public opinion.

The process became particularly important during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Greek schools, churches, newspapers, publications, maps, demographic statistics, political committees, and diplomatic networks were increasingly connected to the wider project of Greek national expansion.

After the First World War, this activity became substantially more systematic. Under Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek government established an international propaganda network whose principal centers were London and Paris. Its purpose was to present Greek territorial demands as historically justified and compatible with the principle of national self-determination.

The campaign reached its most important stage during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–1920 and the Greek occupation of Smyrna (Izmir) in May 1919. Greek propaganda presented the Greek population of western Anatolia as sufficiently large and historically established to justify Greek intervention. At the same time, reports of violence against Christians were used to create international support for Greek claims.

The propaganda campaign did not disappear after the Greek military defeat in Anatolia in 1922. Its narratives continued to influence Greek-Turkish relations, particularly in discussions concerning the Greek minority in Turkey and the political crisis of 1955.

I. Religious and Educational Foundations in the Nineteenth Century

Greek political propaganda did not begin in 1919. Its foundations developed during the nineteenth century through religious, linguistic, and educational networks within the Ottoman Empire.

One example recorded in the available material concerns Reverend J. Brewer, who in 1834 distributed publications of the Bible Society printed in Greek letters in Ottoman towns including Afyon, Kula, Alaşehir, Konya, Isparta, Burdur, Denizli, and Mihalıççık. The activity connected Greek-language religious publishing with communities living outside the Greek kingdom.¹

Education became an even more important instrument. Greek schools did not merely provide instruction in language and religion. They helped connect local Orthodox communities with Greek national culture. In Cyprus, this process became particularly clear. British authorities increasingly regarded Greek education as connected to Hellenic political activity. Sir W. F. Haynes-Smith, the British High Commissioner, warned around the turn of the century that the Greek school system was being organized around Hellenic propaganda.²

Modern scholarship confirms that Greek education in Cyprus was closely connected to the political struggle over the island’s future. Antigone Heraclidou’s study of education under British rule demonstrates that Greek educational institutions became increasingly politicized and that education was closely connected to the development of competing Greek and Turkish national identities.³

The significance of these institutions extended beyond Cyprus. Greek education, Orthodox religious structures, and Greek-language publications contributed to the development of a political identity that could exist beyond the territorial borders of the Greek state.

II. Crete and the Construction of the Christian Victim

Crete provided an early and important example of the political use of Christian victimhood.

Greek propaganda presented the Cretan conflict to European audiences as a struggle between Christian Greeks and Ottoman oppression. Reports that Turks were massacring Christians were used to mobilize European sympathy for the Greek side. The material supplied for this study describes how the Cretan Greek revolt and the violence that accompanied it were incorporated into a narrative of national independence.⁴

The political importance of this narrative was considerable. The conflict could be represented not primarily as a struggle over sovereignty between competing populations but as the liberation of Christians from Ottoman rule.

Eleftherios Venizelos emerged from this political environment. His role in the Cretan question established him as one of the central figures of Greek territorial nationalism. He would later use the same political experience when advancing Greek claims in western Anatolia.⁵

III. Demography as a Political Weapon

During the late Ottoman period, demographic arguments became increasingly important to Greek territorial claims. The basic argument was straightforward: if a territory could be demonstrated to contain a large Greek population, Greek sovereignty over that territory could be presented as the natural expression of national self-determination.

Western Anatolia became the central case. Greek political circles promoted the idea that the Greek population in and around Smyrna was sufficiently large to justify Greek territorial claims. Maps and demographic statistics became important parts of this campaign.⁶

This issue must be treated carefully because population statistics in the period were politically contested. Greek, Ottoman, Allied, and later Turkish sources produced different figures and classifications. The existence of a Greek population in western Anatolia is not in dispute; what was politically decisive was the size of that population and the territorial implications drawn from it.

The Ottoman government and Turkish nationalists developed their own counter-narrative. Ottoman nationalist publications portrayed Greek nationalism, Greek organizations, and the possibility of Greek expansion as a direct threat to the Muslim population of western Anatolia. Emre Erol’s study of western Anatolia demonstrates that the political struggle over Izmir had already become a major issue before 1919 and that competing nationalist projects were transforming the region.⁷

IV. The Organization of Greek Propaganda after 1918

The First World War transformed Greek propaganda from a collection of national and religious activities into a coordinated international political campaign.

Dimitri Kitsikis’s major study of the period shows that the Greek government under Venizelos deliberately developed what amounted to a second front alongside conventional diplomacy: a propaganda front. Kitsikis’s research was based substantially on Greek diplomatic archives from 1918–1923, giving his study unusual access to the internal organization of the campaign.⁸

The main centers were London and Paris. London was especially important because Britain was one of the dominant powers in the postwar settlement of the Ottoman Empire. Greek committees, associations, journalists, academics, and political intermediaries worked to create support for Greek claims.

The campaign employed several methods simultaneously. Greek organizations distributed books and pamphlets, published articles, supplied demographic statistics, produced maps, organized lectures, cultivated journalists, and established relationships with influential politicians and intellectuals.

A contemporary assessment of Kitsikis’s work noted that Greek propaganda did not consist simply of books and articles. It included statistical material, maps, journals, newspapers, and even films.⁹

The system therefore operated on several levels: government diplomacy, organized political lobbying, media influence, academic networks, and mass communication.

V. Ronald Burrows and the British Philhellenic Network

One of the most important British supporters of Greece was Ronald Burrows, a classicist and later principal of King’s College London.

Burrows was deeply involved in philhellenic organizations and regarded modern Greek studies as having a political function. Richard Clogg’s research shows that Burrows and his associates developed an extensive network of British and Greek supporters. The Anglo-Hellenic League explicitly sought to defend what it regarded as the legitimate claims and interests of Greece.¹⁰

The relationship between scholarship and political advocacy was therefore not accidental. Greek interests were promoted through universities, learned societies, newspapers, public lectures, and intellectual networks.

This did not mean that every British classicist or philhellene acted as an agent of the Greek government. The point is narrower and more demonstrable: a significant group of British intellectuals and political activists actively supported Greek territorial claims and helped disseminate them.

The March 1919 propaganda campaign in the British press was one expression of this network. The material supplied for this study identifies Burrows and pro-Greek groups as important participants in the campaign against the Turks.¹¹

VI. The Greek Press and the International Information War

The Greek press was another central instrument. Georgia Eglezou’s study of the Athenian press during the Asia Minor Crisis demonstrates how newspapers helped shape the Greek public’s understanding of the war between 1919 and 1922. Her research shows that much of the Greek press presented the campaign in a way that concealed the seriousness of the military situation and maintained the expectation of success even as the Greek position deteriorated.¹²

This is important because propaganda operated in two directions. Externally, Greek propaganda sought to influence foreign governments and public opinion. Internally, Greek newspapers helped maintain public support for the Asia Minor campaign.

The two functions reinforced each other. A government could continue making territorial claims internationally while maintaining domestic confidence through a controlled or politically aligned press.

VII. Venizelos and the Paris Peace Conference

Venizelos personally played a central role in the international campaign. At the Paris Peace Conference, Greek diplomacy sought to establish Greek claims to territories in Thrace, western Anatolia, and elsewhere. Propaganda provided the supporting political narrative.

Kitsikis describes the Greek government as operating simultaneously through diplomatic and propaganda channels. The objective was to convince the Allied powers that Greek territorial expansion represented the application of national self-determination rather than imperial conquest.¹³

The campaign relied heavily on demographic evidence. Maps and population statistics were used to present Greek claims as objective and measurable. This was particularly important in the case of Smyrna and western Anatolia.

The campaign also relied upon political access. Greek representatives cultivated relationships with British and French officials and sought to ensure that Greek arguments reached influential figures before competing Ottoman and Turkish arguments could dominate the discussion.

VIII. Basil Zaharoff and Private Political Influence

Basil Zaharoff occupied a distinctive position within this network.

A wealthy international arms dealer with extensive connections in Britain and France, Zaharoff was closely associated with the Greek cause. Kitsikis devoted considerable attention to his activities and to his relationships with figures including Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George.¹⁴ The importance of Zaharoff was not simply financial. His value to the Greek campaign lay in his access to political elites.

Kitsikis’s research argues that Zaharoff played a significant role in the decision that resulted in the Allied authorization of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. A contemporary review of Kitsikis’s book specifically highlighted his archival evidence concerning Zaharoff and the decision to place Smyrna under Greek military occupation.¹⁵

This demonstrates the broader character of the Greek campaign: propaganda was combined with diplomacy, lobbying, personal influence, financial resources, and political access.

IX. The Greek Landing at Smyrna, May 1919

The Greek landing at Smyrna on May 15, 1919, transformed the propaganda struggle into a military and territorial conflict.

The occupation had been preceded by years of argument concerning the size and character of the Greek population in western Anatolia. Greek propaganda had established the demographic question as a central justification for Greek intervention.

Once Greek forces landed, the political problem changed. Greece now had to justify an actual military occupation. The Greek government presented the occupation as necessary to protect the Greek population and maintain order. The legal status of the territory was also presented in a carefully constructed manner. Greek authorities maintained that the occupation was military and did not immediately eliminate Ottoman sovereignty.¹⁶

The first day of the occupation nevertheless produced violence. Modern scholarship documents attacks involving Greek troops and local Greek actors against Ottoman soldiers and Muslim and Jewish civilians. Emre Erol’s account of the occupation emphasizes that violence broke out almost immediately after the landing.¹⁷

The violence created a fundamental contradiction for Greek propaganda. The occupation had been justified as a means of protecting civilians and establishing order, yet the occupation itself generated violence against civilians.

X. Metropolitan Chrysostomos and Religious Nationalism

Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Smyrna represented the close connection between Greek nationalism and religious authority.

Chrysostomos had previously served as Metropolitan of Drama, where he had been involved in the political struggle between Greek and Bulgarian national organizations. He later became one of the most prominent Greek political figures in Smyrna.¹⁸

His role during the Greek landing was highly symbolic. Chrysostomos blessed the Greek troops as they entered the city.

The significance was political as well as religious. The Greek Orthodox hierarchy presented the arrival of the Greek army as an event connecting religious identity, Greek national identity, and political sovereignty.

Chrysostomos’s later political statements continued this pattern. His rhetoric identified the Orthodox community, Greek nation, Greek army, and Greek state as parts of a single national entity.¹⁹

XI. Propaganda under the Greek Occupation

Propaganda continued after the occupation.

The available material records reports of rumors that Turks had massacred Greeks and describes the activities of Greek and Cypriot scouts, priests, and Red Cross personnel in the occupied territory.²⁰

Greek authorities also invested money in propaganda. One source cited that 250,000 Ottoman lira were sent to the Aydın and Nazilli regions for propaganda supporting the Greek administration.²¹

The purpose was not simply to convince foreign governments. Propaganda was also intended to establish the legitimacy of Greek rule among the population of the occupied territories.

The Greek administration therefore faced two audiences: the international community and the inhabitants of Anatolia.

XII. Propaganda and the Paris Peace Conference

The political networks created around the Paris Peace Conference remained important throughout the occupation. Greek representatives cultivated relationships with influential Allied politicians and officials. The material refers specifically to contacts surrounding Clemenceau and the conference secretary M. Dutasta.²²

These relationships mattered because the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire was not determined solely by military facts. Political arguments, demographic claims, reports of atrocities, and diplomatic pressure influenced how the Allied powers interpreted competing territorial demands. The Greek campaign therefore sought to establish a narrative before the final territorial settlement was reached.

XIII. The Turkish Counter-Campaign

Greek propaganda was met by an increasingly organized Turkish counter-campaign. Turkish nationalists rejected the Greek demographic argument and portrayed the Greek occupation as a foreign invasion. Ottoman and Turkish nationalist publications emphasized the Muslim majority in Anatolia and warned that Greek territorial expansion would lead to the partition of the Ottoman homeland.

Emre Erol’s work demonstrates that this conflict over political identity and territory was already deeply rooted in western Anatolia before 1919.²³

The propaganda conflict was therefore not simply a matter of Greece presenting information and Turkey responding afterward. Both sides developed competing narratives concerning population, sovereignty, historical legitimacy, violence, and national self-determination.

The important point is that Greek propaganda became especially powerful in the international arena because Greece succeeded in presenting its territorial demands within the language of national self-determination and Christian protection.

XIV. The Collapse of the Greek Position, 1922

The Greek military position collapsed in 1922. The defeat exposed the limitations of the political narrative that had supported the Asia Minor campaign. Greek newspapers had continued to present the military campaign positively, but the final defeat made that narrative increasingly difficult to sustain.

Eglezou’s study of the Greek press demonstrates how newspapers had created an image of continued Greek strength while the military situation was deteriorating.²⁴

The result was not merely a military defeat. It was also a collapse of the political project that had been constructed around the demographic and humanitarian justification for Greek expansion in Anatolia. The population exchange that followed permanently transformed the demographic structure of Greece and Turkey.

XV. Propaganda after 1922

The end of Greek military rule in Anatolia did not end the political use of the Greek population question. The Greek minority remaining in Istanbul and the broader issue of Greek-Turkish relations continued to be politically important. Alexis Alexandris’s study of the Greek minority in Istanbul traces these relations from 1918 through 1974 and documents the changing political position of the Greek community within Turkey.²⁵

This later history shows that the demographic question remained central to Greek-Turkish relations even after the territorial struggle of 1919–1922 had ended.

The political language changed. The objective was no longer simply the annexation of western Anatolia. Instead, Greek diplomacy increasingly focused on minority rights, property, population exchange, religious institutions, and the protection of the remaining Greek population.

XVI. The Crisis of 1955

The events of September 1955 represented another major crisis in Greek-Turkish relations. The Greek minority in Istanbul had already become a central issue in relations between Greece and Turkey. The political importance of the community was intensified by the Cyprus dispute and by the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations during the 1950s.

The available material describes Greek propaganda reaching a peak during the period surrounding the 1955 crisis and refers to subsequent Greek demands concerning compensation for the Greek population of Anatolia.²⁶

The significance of this period lies in the continuity of the political framework. The Greek population question remained an instrument of international diplomacy, while Greek political narratives continued to present the protection of Greek communities as a central issue in relations with Turkey.

Alexandris’s study provides the necessary broader context for understanding this period, tracing the position of the Greek minority and Greek-Turkish relations across the twentieth century.²⁷

Conclusion

Greek propaganda developed gradually from nineteenth-century religious and educational networks into a sophisticated international political system.

Its early foundation was cultural. Greek-language religious publications, schools, churches, and educational institutions helped establish a Greek national identity among Orthodox communities living outside the Greek state. Crete provided an early example of how Christian victimhood and national liberation could be combined to justify territorial change.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, demographic arguments had become central. Greek political organizations increasingly presented Ottoman territories as Greek through maps, population statistics, historical arguments, and claims concerning the cultural and religious identity of local populations.

After 1918, the system became international and systematic. Venizelos understood that diplomatic negotiations alone were insufficient. Greece therefore established a propaganda network extending through London, Paris, and other Western capitals. Political committees, newspapers, academics, journalists, religious leaders, and wealthy private supporters all contributed to the campaign.

The campaign reached its decisive moment in 1919. Greek propaganda had established the demographic and humanitarian argument for Greek intervention in western Anatolia. When Greek troops landed at Smyrna, the occupation could therefore be presented as the protection of an established Greek population rather than as territorial expansion.

The subsequent violence demonstrated the contradiction between the humanitarian justification of the occupation and the realities of military rule. The occupation generated violence against Muslim and Jewish civilians as well as Ottoman troops, while Greek authorities continued to defend the political legitimacy of their presence.

The Greek propaganda campaign ultimately failed to secure permanent Greek control of western Anatolia. The military defeat of 1922 ended the territorial project. It did not, however, end the political narratives that had developed around it.

The demographic, humanitarian, religious, and historical arguments continued to shape Greek-Turkish relations throughout the twentieth century. The Greek minority in Istanbul, the Cyprus dispute, property claims, and the crisis of 1955 all became part of a longer political history in which population and national identity remained central.

Greek propaganda was therefore not a temporary wartime phenomenon. It was a long-term political instrument. It operated through education, religion, newspapers, demographic statistics, maps, diplomacy, lobbying, academic networks, and private political influence. Its most important achievement was not the permanent territorial expansion of Greece into Anatolia, which ultimately failed, but the establishment of a powerful international narrative through which Greek territorial claims could be presented as the defense of an endangered national population.

Notes

Dimitri Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası, trans. Hakkı Devrim (Istanbul: Meydan Neşriyat, 1964), discussion of Reverend J. Brewer and the distribution of Greek-language Bible Society publications in Ottoman Anatolia.
Antigone Heraclidou, Imperial Control in Cyprus: Education and Political Manipulation in the British Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017). Heraclidou’s study discusses the political role of Greek education in Cyprus and the British administration’s concern with Hellenic political influence.
Heraclidou, Imperial Control in Cyprus.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Dimitri Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale: La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la paix (1919–1920) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 537 pp. The book’s contents and indexed terms specifically include Greek population claims, maps, statistics, Smyrna, propaganda, London, and Venizelos.
Emre Erol, The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia: Turkey’s Belle Époque and the Transition to a Modern Nation State (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 336 pp.
Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. The study was based extensively on Greek diplomatic archives from 1918–1923.
Maurice Baumont, review of Dimitri Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale, Le Monde, January 16, 1964. Baumont specifically describes the use of books, pamphlets, articles, statistics, maps, newspapers, and films.
Richard Clogg, Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), especially chap. 4, “The ‘ingenious enthusiasm’ of Dr Burrows and the ‘unsatiated hatred’ of Professor Toynbee,” 36–59.
Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale.
Georgia Eglezou, The Greek Media in World War I and Its Aftermath: The Athenian Press and the Asia Minor Crisis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 261 pp.
Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. The book specifically examines Greek propaganda and pressure during the Paris Peace Conference.
Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. Basil Zaharoff is one of the major figures indexed in the book.
Baumont, review of Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. Baumont states that Kitsikis used previously inaccessible Greek diplomatic archives and identifies Zaharoff’s influence over the decision concerning Smyrna.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Erol, The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia. Erol’s account of the May 15, 1919 landing describes the outbreak of violence involving Greek troops, local Greeks, Ottoman soldiers, and civilians.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
See also the discussion of Chrysostomos’s nationalist rhetoric in modern scholarship on Smyrna and Greek nationalism.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Erol, The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia.
Eglezou, The Greek Media in World War I and Its Aftermath.
Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918–1974 (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 391 pp.
Dimitri Kitsikis, Yunan Propagandası.
Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918–1974. A second edition was published in Athens in 1992.

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